Buffalo Environmental Law Journal
Volume 15
Number 1 Issue 1-2

Article 2

1-1-2008

MEAs with Trade Measures and the WTO: Aiming toward
Sustainable Development?
Miguel A. Elizalde Carranza

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.buffalo.edu/belj
Part of the Environmental Law Commons, and the Land Use Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Miguel A. Carranza, MEAs with Trade Measures and the WTO: Aiming toward Sustainable Development?,
15 Buff. Envtl. L.J. 43 (2007-2008).
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.buffalo.edu/belj/vol15/iss1/2

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at Digital Commons @ University at
Buffalo School of Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Buffalo Environmental Law Journal by an authorized
editor of Digital Commons @ University at Buffalo School of Law. For more information, please contact
lawscholar@buffalo.edu.

MEAs WITH TRADE MEASURES AND THE
WTO: AIMING TOWARD SUSTAINABLE

DEVELOPMENT?
MIGUEL

A. ELIZALDE CARRANZA*

INTRODUCTION

The objective of sustainable development' represents the
best option for the international community to provide a common
solution to two of the most urgent international problems:
environmental degradation and development needs, especially of
the poorest countries. 2 In order to achieve this objective, mutual
support between economic and environmental policies is essential .
At the international normative level, this depends, at least in part,
on favoring synergies among Multilateral Environmental Agreements (MEAs) and the trade agreements administered by the

* Ph.D in Law (Cum Laude), Universitat Pompeu Fabra, Barcelona, Spain.
The World Commission on Environment and Development defined sustainable
development as "development that meets the needs of the present without
compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs."
WORLD COMM'N ON ENV'T & DEV., OUR COMMON FUTURE 43 (1987).
2 See 2005 World Summit Outcome, G.A. Res. 60/1,
19, U.N. Doc.
A/RES/60/I (Oct. 24, 2005); World Summit on Sustainable Development,
Johannesburg, S. Afr., Aug. 26-Sept. 4, 2002, Report on the World Summit on
Sustainable Development: Johannesburg Declaration on Sustainable Development, 5, U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 199/20 [hereinafter Johannesburg Declaration];
United Nations Conference on Environment and Development, Rio de Janeiro,
June 3-14, 1992, Report of the United Nations Conference on Environment and
Development: Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, princs. 4-5,
U.N. Doc. A/CONF.151/5/Rev.I (June 13, 1992), reprintedin [1992] 31 I.L.M.
874, 877 [hereinafter Rio Declaration]; United Nations Conference on
Environment and Development, Rio de Janeiro, June 3-14, 1992, Resolutions
Adopted by the Conference,
I, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.151/26/Rev.1 (1992)
[hereinafter Agenda 21].
3 Agenda 21, supra note 2, 2.19. See also Rio Declaration, supra note 2, princ.
4.
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World Trade Organization (WTO).4 In general, these normative
systems can be mutually supportive, since the attainment of their
goals produce reciprocal benefits. Environmental protection is
needed to keep all imaginable economic activity alive, and international trade fosters growth and produces wealth that could be
used to enhance environmental protection. 5 Nevertheless, the
efficacy of MEAs could be affected by WTO rules. On the one
hand, these normative systems regulate the use of trade measures
from different perspectives. On the other hand, institutional differences between these regimes seem to ensure a major normative
influence of the WTO. 6 This article will argue that the best
manner to favor MEAs and WTO synergies is to perform a
teleological interpretation of the WTO rules, particularly Article
XX of the GATT.
Part I of this article explains why, being part of different
branches of international law, MEAs and WTO rules overlap.
Here, the functions and types of trade measures in MEAs are
described, as well as GATT limits and exceptions to their
application. Although MEAs could interact with different WTO
agreements, these interactions have more possibilities of occurring
within the context of the GATT. Therefore, this article's comments are limited to that agreement. Part I examines whether there
is a preference for multilateral measures in the WTO. This part
concludes with an analysis of the institutional differences between
4 The

General Assembly of the United Nations has said that "[t]here is a need for
the World Trade Organization . . . to consider ways to make trade and
environment mutually supportive, including through due respect for the objectives and principles of the multilateral trading system and for the provisions of
multilateral environmental agreements." See Programme for the Further
Implementation of Agenda 21, 29 (i), at 16, U.N. Doc. A/RES/S-19/2 (Sept.
19, 1997) [hereinafter Programme of Agenda 21]. See also Shawkat Alam, The
United Nations' Approach to Trade, the Environment and Sustainable
Development, 12 ILSA J. INT'L & COMp. L. 607, 621 (2006) (explaining that

"the international community is called upon to 'ensure that environmental and
trade policies are mutually supportive, with a view to achieving sustainable
development"' (quoting Agenda 21, supra note 2, 2.10(d))).
5See Agenda 21, supra note 2, 2.5, 2.19, 30.2 and 30.3.
6See

Claire R. Kelly, Power, Linkage andAccomodation: The WTO as an InternationalActor and Its Influence on Other Actors and Regimes, 24 BERKELEY J.
INT'L. L. 79, 83-84 (2006).
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these regimes that would most likely attract MEA-WTO disputes
to the Dispute Settlement Body (DSB) of the WTO. Part II
explores whether MEAs can be applicable Law in the DSB. To that
end, this article questions whether the WTO is a self-contained
regime, and if so, whether this is important when determining what
is applicable law in the DSB. This part concludes with a comment
about the limited benefits of the most contentious aspects of MEAWTO interactions: considering non-WTO rule applicable law in
the DSB. Part III explores the issue of MEAs as a means to
interpret the WTO rules and presents an outline of what may be the
best approach to favor MEA and WTO synergies: a teleological
interpretation of the WTO rules. This part concludes with a
description of how the principle of systemic integration can be
applied to the less contentious aspects of MEA-WTO interactions.
I. TwO REGIMES REGULATING TRADE MEASURES FROM
DIFFERENT PERSPECTIVES:

A.

MEAS

AND THE

WTO

Functions and Types of Trade Measures in MEAS

Trade measures have been used to protect the environment
since the nineteenth century.7 The impact of economic activities
on the environment, of which trade is a part, explains the use of
market instruments to protect the environment. 8 The term trade or
commercial measure refers to any instrument that sets up
requirements, conditions or restrictions to imported or exported
products or to their import or export processes. 9 When a trade

7 Steve Charnovitz, A Taxonomy of Environmental Trade Measures, 6 GEO.
INT'L ENVTL. L. REV. 1, 16-17 (1993).

8 Michael Bothe, Le Droit de l'environnement: sa voie de diveloppement entre

dcologie et 6conomie, in LA POLITIQUE DE L'ENVIRONNEMENT:
REGLAMENTATION AUX INSTRUMENTS

ECONOMIQUES 46 (Michael

DE LA
Bothe &

Peter. H. Sand eds., Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 2003).
9 See Winfried Lang, Les mesures commerciales au service de la protection de
l'environnement, 99 REVUE GENERALE DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC 545,
545-46 (1995) (Fr.); Arvind Subramanian, Trade Measuresfor Environment: A
Nearly Empty Box?, 15 WORLD ECON. 135, 135-52 (1992).
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measure is used to protect the environment it is known as an
environmental trade measure.l°
The WTO has identified 14 MEAs that include trade
measures as tools to achieve environmental objectives." Speaking
in quantitative terms, this number is low. It represents no more
than 10 percent of the total number of environmental agreements in

force. However, the importance of these agreements should not be
underestimated.

Among these agreements are those dealing with

some of the most urgent international environmental problems,
such as: global warming, ozone layer degradation, the loss of wild

flora and fauna and biodiversity, among others. 12
Trade measures used in the MEA context are known as
multilateral trade measures to protect the environment (multilateral

measures). 13 These measures result from international consensus
framed in a MEA or in an international agreement that, even if its
main purpose is not environmental protection, contains conservation-related trade measures. 14

A distinction should be made

10 See Org. for Econ. Coop. & Dev. [OECD], Trade Measures in Multilateral
Environmental Agreements: Synthesis Report of Three Case Studies, at 11,
OECD Doc. COM/ENV/TD(98)127/FINAL (Feb. 12, 1999); Chiedu Osakwe,
Finding New Packages of Acceptable Combinations of Trade and Positive
Measures to Improve the Efectiveness of MEAs: A General Framework, in
TRADE AND THE ENVIRONMENT: BRIDGING THE GAP 38, 49 (Agata Fijalkowski
et al. eds., 1998).
" See Committee on Trade and Environment Special Session, Note by the
Secretariat: Matrix on Trade Measures Pursuant to Selected Multilateral
Environmental Agreements,
WT/CTE/W/160/Rev.3,
TN/TE/S/5/Rev. I
(February 16, 2005). Other sources state that 10% of the total number of MEAs
include trade measures; that is approximately 23 MEAs. J. JUSTE, Protecci6n
del medio ambiente y comercio internacional, Vol. VII CURSOS
EUROMEDITERRANEOS BANCAJA DE DERECHO INTERNACIONAL 444 (2003); J.
Cardona Llorents, Limites al libre comercio: el medio ambiente, in La Uni6n
Europea y el comercio internacional: limites al libre comercio 81, 91(F. Esteve
Garcia (coord.), 2001).
12INT'L INST. SUSTAINABLE DEV. & U.N. ENV'T PROGRAMME, ENVIRONMENT
AND TRADE: A HANDBOOK 14-18 (2d. ed. 2005) [hereinafter IISD/UNEP].
13Johanna Rinceanu, Enforcement Mechanisms in InternationalEnvironmental
Law: Quo Vadunt?, 15 J. ENVTL. L. & LITIG. 147, 167 (2000).
14 Paul Demaret, TREMs, Multilateralism, Unilateralism and the GATT, in
TRADE AND THE ENVIRONMENT: THE SEARCH FOR BALANCE 52, 52 (James
Cameron et al. eds., 1994); Mark Edward Foster, Trade and Environment:
Making Room for Environmental Trade Measures within the GATT, 71 S. CAL.
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between multilateral measures and unilateral measures. The latter
are adopted by one State without the cooperation
or consent of
5
other States or international institutions.'
The trade measures contained in MEAs can be of different
types and used for various purposes. Among the most common
trade measures are quantitative restrictions, procedures based on
information and consent requirements, and ecolabels. Import or
export quantitative restrictions are employed basically to eliminate
supply and demand of products with direct or indirect negative
effects on the environment. 16 For example, trade bans on ivory or
products thereof could help to protect African elephants mainly
hunted down and killed for their tusks. Now, since the environment has no concept of political boundaries, cooperation between
all countries involved in activities that affect the environment is,
most of the time, a necessary condition for MEAs to be truly
effective. Thus, trade bans are included in some MEAs as an
instrument of economic pressure to induce either third party
393, 411 (1998) (explaining that multilateral environmental trade
measures are those taken pursuant to some international consensus-the most
common sources of such consensus being multilateral environmental
agreements); Gretchen L. Gaston & Randall S. Abate, The Biosafety Protocol
and the World Trade Organization: Can the Two Coexist?, 12 PACE INT'L L.
REV. 107, 126 (2000).
15 Belina Anderson, Unilateral Trade Measures and Environmental
Protection
Policy, 66 TEMP. L. REV. 751, 754 (1993); Richard B. Bilder, The Role of
Unilateral State Action in Preventing International Environmental Injury, 14
VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 51, 53 (1981). See Laurence Boisson de Chazournes,
Unilateralismand Environmental Protection: Issues of Perception and Reality,
II EUR. J. INT'L L. 315, 319-20 (2000); Robert Hage, International Trade and
Environmental Policy, 86 AM. SOC'Y INT'L L. PROC. 224, 225-30 (1992).
16 See International Plant Protection Convention, art. VII, Oct.
2, 2005, http://
www.fao.org/Legal/Treaties/004t-e.htm; Stockholm Convention on Persistent
Organic Pollutants, art. 3, I (a)(ii), May 22, 2001, 40 I.L.M. 532, 534 (2001);
Convention on the Prior Informed Consent Procedure for Certain Hazardous
Chemicals and Pesticides in International Trade, art. 10, 4(a)(ii), Sept. I1,
1998, 38 I.L.M. 1, 6-7 (1999) [hereinafter Rotterdam Convention]; United
Nations Environment Programme Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Global
Convention on the Control of Transboundary Movements of Hazardous Wastes:
Final Act and Text of Basel Convention, art. 4, 2(e), (g), Mar. 22, 1989, 28
I.L.M. 649, 662 (1989) [hereinafter Basel Convention]; Convention on
International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora, arts. Il-VI,
Mar. 3, 1973, 27 U.S.T. 1087 [hereinafter CITES].
L. REV.
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adherence to the agreements or obedience to its environmental
obligations. Environmental taxes are also sometimes contained in
MEAs. 17 Their function is to allocate contamination costs to
sellers, buyers or producers of the product directly or indirectly
responsible for contamination. Some MEAs include trade measures in the form of procedures that condition trade of certain
potentially harmful products on information and consent requirements. One of the most illustrative examples of this kind of trade
measure is the prior informed consent procedure. In the context of
procedure, the importing state is granted the opportunity to assess
the environmental impact of a given product based on the information provided by the exporting country. Without the consent of
the importing country, trade is not permitted. Ecolabels, for their
part, serve to inform consumers about the environmental impact of

a product.18
All these measures could be included in MEAs as a specific
trade obligation or simply as an authorized trade obligation.
Specific trade obligations are those individually identified in a
MEA as the measure that contracting parties must use to pursue its
environmental goal,' 9 while authorized measures are those

'7 The use of market instruments is explicitly permitted in Article 2,
I(v) of the
Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate
Change [hereinafter Kyoto Protocol]. Kyoto Protocol, art.2,
1(v), Dec. 10,
1997, 37 I.L.M. 22, 33 (1998).
18 Some of the MEAs including prior informed consent procedures or ecolabel
systems are: the Convention on Biological Diversity, art. 15, 5, June 5, 1992,
31 I.L.M. 818 (1992); the Rotterdam Convention, supra note 16, arts. 5-8; the
Basel Convention, supra note 16, art. 4, 13; and CITES, supra note 16, arts. IllVIII. Aside from the measures just mentioned, some MEAs include protection
instruments whose impact on trade is less evident; for instance, green house
emission trading in the context of the Kyoto Protocol or the Convention on
Biological Diversity dispositions regarding technology transfer, protection of
traditional knowledge, and fair and equitable sharing of benefits arising out of
the utilization of genetic resources.
19 For example, Article XIV,
I of CITES states that "[t]he provisions of the
present Convention shall in no way affect the right of Parties to adopt: (a)
stricter domestic measures regarding the conditions for trade, taking, possession
or transport of specimens of species included in Appendices I, II and III, or the
complete prohibition thereof." See CITES, supra note 16, art. XIV,
I
(emphasis added). Although, CITES authorizes the use of restictive measures to
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permitted in MEAs, but not individually identified. In other
words, contracting parties in a MEA are authorized to freely
choose the type of trade measure to pursue the agreement's
objective. Of importance is that sometimes the use of trade mea20
sures is recommended by the MEAs' administrative institutions,
even when the environmental agreement
contains no specific or
2
authorized trade obligations whatsoever. '
B.

Trade Measures Regulation in the GATT

Trade barriers are the anathema of international trade advocates because they hinder economic exploitation of comparative
advantages and efficient distribution of natural resources. 22 Thus,
attain its protection goals, it does not clarify what kind of measures it is referring
to when it uses the term "stricterdomestic measures."
'0 For instance, the Conference of the Parties to the Montreal Protocol on
Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer authorized the application of import
restrictions on products containing controlled substances from the Russian
Federation because it was not fulfilling the agreement's obligations. Conference
of the Parties to the Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone
Layer, Vienna, Austria, Dec. 5-7, 1995, Report of the Seventh Meeting of the
Partiesto the Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer, §
V,
43, dec. VII/18, U.N. Doc. UNEP/OzL.Pro.7/12 (Dec. 27, 1995). See
generally United Nations: Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer,
Sep. 16, 1987, S. TREATY Doc. No. 10, 100th Cong., 1st Sess., 26 I.L.M. 1541
(1987) [hereinafter Montreal Protocol]. For a study of the "non compliance
procedures" in MEAs, see Angel Rodrigo, Nuevas tdcnicas juridicas para la
aplicaci6n de los tratados internacionales del medio ambiente, in CURSOS DE
DERECHO INTERNACIONAL

Y

RELACIONES

INTERNACIONALES

DE VITORIA-

GASTEIZ 155 (Universidad del Pais Vasco, 2001); Markus Ehrmann, Procedures

of Compliance Control in International Environmental Treaties, 13 COLO. J.
INT'L ENVTL. L. & POL'Y 377 (2002).
21 The International Whaling Commission has requested that its Contracting
Parties apply trade restrictions to some products and equipment used for whale
fishing, even though the International Convention for the Regulation of Whaling
does not contain specific or authorized trade measures. International Whaling
Commission, 2 9 th Annual Meeting, Prevention of Importation of Whale
Products, International Whaling Commission Resolution, Appendix 7 (1977);
International Convention for the Regulation of Whaling, Dec. 2, 1946, 62 Stat.
1716, 1953 U.N.T.S. 74; Protocol to the International Convention for the
Regulation of Whaling, Nov. 19, 1956, 10 U.S.T. 952.
22 JOHN H. JACKSON, THE WORLD TRADING SYSTEM: LAW AND POLICY OF

INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC RELATIONS 14-17 (1989) [hereinafter The World
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the international trade regime was born with the aim of raising
standards of living through reduction of tariffs and other barriers to
trade and elimination of discriminatory treatment in international
commerce. 23 Therefore, trade barriers and discrimination are, as a
general principle, forbidden in trade agreements.
1.

General Rules and Exceptions

Articles I, III and XI are the normative pillars of the GATT.
According to Article I, known as the most favored nation clause,
WTO Members must give the same commercial treatment to
products of other Members if they are deemed to be like. 4 The
national treatment clause in Article III prevents Members from
treating goods from other Members in a less favorable manner than
like domestic products. 25 Quantitative
import or export restrictions
26
are prohibited by Article XI.

Trade obligations in the Montreal Protocol on Substances
that Deplete the Ozone Layer27 (Montreal Protocol) are useful

Trading System]; Patrick Lane, World trade survey: Why trade is good for you,
ECONOMIST, Oct. 3, 1998, at S4.
23 John H. Jackson, The World Trading System, supra note 22, at 139-142. The
Uruguay Round of multilateral negotiations brought profound changes in the
international trade regime: after almost 50 years of the GATT, the World Trade
Organization (WTO) was finally formed. The WTO is in charge of the
administration of the commercial agreements of the multilateral trading system,
serves as a forum for negotiation among its members and supervises their trade
policies. Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral
Trade Negotiations, Apr. 15, 1994, 33 I.L.M. 1143 (1994) [hereinafter WTO
Agreement]. For a general study of the changes in the international trade regime
after the Uruguay Round, see A. M. Avila, J. A. Castillo & M. A. Diaz,
REGULACION

DEL COMERCIO

INTERNACIONAL

TRAS LA

RONDA URUGUAY

(Editorial Tecnos, 1994).
24 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat, A-1 1,
55
U.N.T.S. 194 [hereinafter GATT]. For a general discussion of the most favored
nation clause, see G. C. Hufbauer et al., The GA TT Codes and the Unconditional
Most-Favored-NationPrinciple, 12 LAW & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 59 (1980).
25 GATT, supra note 24, art. Ill. For a general discussion of the national
treatment clause, see John H. Jackson, National Treatment Obligations and
Non-TariffBarriers, 10 MICH. J. INT'L L. 207 (1989).
26
27

GATT, supra note 24, art. XI.
Montreal Protocol, supra note 20.
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speculating about the way in which possible interactions between
the normative pillars of the GATT and multilateral environmental
trade measures (multilateral measures) could occur. The Montreal
Protocol forbids trade of substances referred to as controlled
substances from or to any country that is not a contracting party,
unless it can prove fulfillment of the agreement obligations even
though it is not a party.28 Imagine that States A, B and C are all
members of the WTO, but only A and B are parties to the Montreal
Protocol. If A imports or exports controlled substances from or to
B but forbids trade with C, GATT Article I would be violated
because it demands that any advantage, favor, privilege or immunity granted by any contracting party to any product originating in
or destined for any other country, shall be accorded immediately
and unconditionally to the like product originating in or destined
for the territories of all other contracting parties. 29 Likewise, since
domestic production or consumption of controlled substances in
States party to the Montreal Protocol is not forbidden, although it
is subject to some limitations, third-party-aimed trade prohibitions
go against the letter of Article III if both States are WTO
Members. 30 As stated before, the national treatment clause in
Article III prevents Members from granting goods from other
Members less favorable commercial treatment than to "like"
domestic products.31 Moreover, given that trade bans or total trade
prohibitions are equivalent to a quantitative restriction that equals
zero, any import or export prohibition of controlled substances
would be contrary to GATT Article XI. The only option for this
2
29

Id. art. 4,
1-2, 8.
Rosalind Twum-Barina & Laura B. Campbell,

PROTECTING THE OZONE

LAYER THROUGH TRADE MEASURES: RECONCILING THE TRADE PROVISIONS OF
THE MONTREAL PROTOCOL AND THE RULES OF THE GATT 58-59 (1994).
30

Kelly Jude Hunt, International Environmental Agreements in Conflict with

GATT - Greening GA 7T after the Uruguay Round Agreement, 30 INT'L LAW.
163, 170 (1996); Janet McDonald, Greening the GATT: Harmonizing Free
Trade and Environmental Protection in the New World Order, 23 ENVTL. L.
397, 451-53 (1993).
3' These prohibitions cannot be justified as internal regulations within
the

meaning of the interpretative note of GATT Article IIl, because the commercial
treatment of domestic controlled substances is different to that given to

controlled substances of countries not parties to the Montreal Protocol. See
GATT, supra note 24, annex I, ad art. Ill.
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kind of multilateral measure to avoid a GATT violation would be
if it could find 32justification in one of the environmental exceptions
of Article XX
Article XX's purpose is to avoid GATT interpretations that
could prevent the adoption or enforcement by any contracting
party of measures, i.e. trade measures, to pursue some the legiti33
mate public policy goals explicitly mentioned in the Article.
Article XX provides in paragraphs (a) to () a series of specific
cases in which Members would be exempted from GATT obligations. To a large extent, through paragraphs (b) and (g), environmental protection could be considered one of these legitimate
public goals. Paragraph (b) permits the adoption of measures that
are necessary to protect human, animal or plant life or health. For
its part, paragraph (g) permits measures relating to the conservation of exhaustible natural resources, if they are made effective in
conjunction with restrictions on domestic production or consumption. If a multilateral measure satisfies either paragraph (b) or (g)
conditions, it would be only provisionally justified until the
requirements of the introductory clause or chapeau of Article XX
are also met. 34 The chapeau is intended to prevent the abuse of the
general exceptions set out in Article XX. 35 For this reason, for a
measure to be given permanent justification it must not result in
arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination and should not constitute a
disguised restriction on international trade.

32

Id. art. XX; Axel Bree, Article XX GA TT-Quo Vadis? The Environmental

Exception after the Shrimp/Turtle Appellate Body Report, 17 DICK. J. INT'L L.

99, 103-04 (1998). For an early examination of GATT's Article XX
environmental exceptions see Steve Charnovitz, Exploring the Environmental
Exceptions in GA7TArticleX, 25 J. WORLD TRADE 37 (1991).
33 See Panel Report, Thailand--Restrictionson Importation of and Internal Taxes
on Cigarettes, 73-74, DSI0/R (Oct. 5, 1990) (adopted Nov. 7, 1990), GATT
B.I.S.D. 37S/200 [hereinafter Thai Cigarette case]; Panel Report, Canada
Measures Affecting Exports of UnprocessedHerring and Salmon,

4.6, L/6268

(Nov. 20, 1987) (adopted Mar. 22, 1988), GATT B.I.S.D. 35S/98 [hereinafter
Canada-Herring case].
34 Appellate Body Report,

United States--Standards for Reformulated and

ConventionalGasoline, at 22, WT/DS2/AB/R (Apr. 29, 1996) (adopted May 20,
1996) [hereinafter U.S. Gasoline case].
35 Id.

2007]

SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT

On different occasions WTO Members-and previously,
contracting parties to the GATT of 1947-have applied unilateral
trade measures to pursue environmental goals. As stated earlier, a
unilateral trade measure is one that is adopted by one State without
cooperation or consent of other States or international institutions
objective defined by their domestic
to achieve some environmental
36
procedures.
decision making
Unilateral measures are not forbidden by any WTO
agreement, hence they are not per se inconsistent with the GATT.37
Nevertheless, up until now, no measure of this kind has ever been
declared compatible with GATT/WTO rules or has found justification in the environmental exceptions of GATT Article XX. 38 The
reason has been, at least in part, due to the restrictive, narrow and
non-textual interpretations of the GATT's environmental exceptions. 39 This article will not provide an exhaustive description of
36

See Boisson de Chazournes, supranote 15.

See Appellate Body Report, United States-Import Prohibition of Certain
121, WT/DS58/AB/R (Oct. 12, 1998)
Shrimp and Shrimp Products,
[hereinafter U.S.- Shrimp case]; Miguel. A. Elizalde, La legalidad de las
medidas comerciales unilaterales para proteger el Medio Ambiente en el
Sistema Multilateral del Comercio, 6 REVISTA INTERDISCIPLINAR DE GESTION
AMBIENTAL 29, 29-42 (2004).
38 See, e.g., U.S.- Shrimp case, supra note 37; Panel Report, United StatesImport Prohibitionof Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products, WT/DS58/R (May
15, 1998); U.S. Gasoline case, supra note 34; Panel Report, United StatesStandards for Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline, WT/DS2/R (Jan. 29,
1996); Panel Report, United States-Taxes on Automobiles, DS3 I/R (Oct. II,
1994) (unadopted) [hereinafter U.S.-Automobiles case]; Panel Report, United
States--Restrictions on Imports of Tuna, DS29/R (June 16, 1994) (unadopted)
[hereinafter U.S.-Tuna/Dolphin II case]; Panel Report, United StatesRestrictions on Imports of Tuna, DS21/R (Sept. 3, 1991) (unadopted), GATT
B.I.S.D. 39S/155 [hereinafter U.S.-Tuna/Dolphin I case]; Thai Cigarette case,
supra note 33; Canada-Herring case, supra note 33; Panel Report, United
States-Prohibition of Imports of Tuna and Tuna Products from Canada,
L/5198 (Dec. 22, 1981) (adopted Feb. 22, 1982), GATT B.I.S.D. 29S/91
[hereinafter U.S.-Canadian Tuna case].
39 Donald M. McRae, GATT Article XX and the WTO Appellate Body, in NEW
37

DIRECTIONS IN INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW, ESSAYS IN HONOR OF JOHN
JACKSON 219, 227-30 (Marco Brockers & Reinhard Quick eds., 2000); Sanford

Gaines, The WTO's Reading of the GATT Article XX Chapeau: A Disguised
Restriction on Environmental Measures, 22 U. PA. J. INT'L ECON. L. 739, 746
(2001).
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the way in which these exceptions have been interpreted. However, it will give some examples to illustrate some of the insurmountable difficulties States that employed unilateral measures
have had to face when attempting to find justification in Article
XX's environmental exceptions.
2.

Environmental Exceptions Practice

Before the formation of the WTO, GATT Panels made non-

literal interpretations of paragraphs (b) and (g), resulting in
artificial conditions that no measure was able to meet. In the US.Tuna/Dolphin I case, for instance, the Panel concluded that a
measure based on unpredictable conditions could not be regarded
as necessary to protect human, animal or plant life or health as is
required by Article XX paragraph (b). 40 It is clear that this predictability condition is far from the ordinary meaning of the term
necessary. For its part, the U.S.-Tuna/Dolphin II Panel concluded
that "those measures taken so as to force other countries to change
their policies, and that were effective only if such changes
occurred, could not be considered 'necessary' either. ''4 1 As trade
disputes regularly imply that one country may try to control other
countries' behavior, some authors have pointed out that this non-

40

U.S.-Tuna/Dolphin I case, supra note 38,

5.28. The United States applied an

import prohibition on Mexican yellowfin tuna and products thereof, arguing that
Mexican harvesting methods caused incidental killing of dolphins exceeding the
amount permitted by the Marine Mammal Protection Act (MMPA). Marine
Mammal Protection, 16 U.S.C.A. 1371 (2003).
41U.S.-Tuna/Dolphin II case, supra note 38, 5.39. The measure examined in
the Tuna/Dolphin I case also prohibited importing tuna products from countries
trading with other countries exceeding the mortality rate permitted by the
MMPA. The restriction on intermediary countries gave rise to the Tuna/Dolphin
II case. The arguments in both disputes therefore, were similar. The Panel in the
Tuna/Dolphin II case observed that the protection of the dolphins could not be
achieved solely with the import restriction applied to exporting and intermediary
countries; in addition, a change in their protection policies and practices was
needed. In the Tuna/Dolphin II Panel's opinion, the United States' measure
aimed to force this change of protection policies and practices in other countries,
was in other words, outside its jurisdiction.
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literal interpretation of paragraph (b) imposed conditions that were
almost impossible to meet.42
As regards to paragraph (g), in 1988 the Panel in the
Canada-Herringcase observed that in order to be considered
relating to the conservation of exhaustible natural resources, the
measure had to be primarily aimed at such conservation.4 3 It seems
that with this interpretation, the Panel was trying to prevent those
measures with a merely collateral relation with the conservation
elements from obtaining provisional justification in paragraph (g).
Nevertheless, this interpretation fails to find support either in the
text of paragraph (g) or in its drafting history. 4 This did not stop
the U.S-TunaDolphin I and 11 Panels from following the same
dubious line of interpretation.45
With the formation of WTO and its DSB in 1994, interpretation of the GATT evolved favorably. Through a literal
interpretation of the GATT, the Appellate Body eliminated most of
the artificial conditions that had been added to paragraphs (b) and
(g) by previous Panels.46 In fact, all environmental measures
examined after WTO creation have met with the conditions as
stipulated in paragraphs (b) and (g) with relative ease.
Currently, a trade measure could be considered necessary in
terms of paragraph (b) unless there is a less WTO-inconsistent
alternative measure reasonably available to the importing country,
which serves to achieve the objective pursued with the same degee

42

Carrie Wofford, A Greener Future at the WTO: The Refinement of WTO

Jurisprudence on Environmental Exceptions to GA77, 24 HARV. ENVTL. L.
REv. 563,579 (2000).
43 Canada-Herring case, supra note 33,
4.6. See Peter L. Lallas et al.,
Environmental Protection and International Trade: Toward Mutually Supportive Rules and Policies, 16 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 271, 283 n.78 (1992).
44 Steve Charnovitz, Green Roots, Bad Pruning: GATi Rules and Their
Application to Environmental Trade Measures, 7 TUL. ENVTL. L.J. 299, 328-29
(1994).
45 U.S.-Tuna/Dolphin 11case, supra note 38, 5.27; U.S.-Tuna/Dolphin I case,
supra note 38, 5.33.
46 Wofford, supra note 42, at 573. See Howard F. Chang, Environmental
Trade
Measures, the Shrimp-Turtle Rulings, and the Ordinary Meaning of the Text of
the GATT, 8 CHAP. L. REV. 25, 27-29 (2005).
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of efficacy.4 7 In addition, the more important the values pursued,

the easier it may be for the DSB to accept them as necessary
measures designed to achieve those ends.48 As for paragraph (g),
the Appellate Body has observed that a measure could be

considered relating to conservation if there is a close and genuine
relationship of ends (natural resources conservation) and means
(commercial restriction).4 9
Although Appellate Body interpretations of the GATT have

made it relatively easy for a trade measure to find provisional
justification in Article XX (b) and (g), these interpretations have

also made it harder to satisfy introductory clause requirements.
Only one measure has been able to overcome these conditions and
it was not an environmental but a sanitary restriction. 50 Once
again, the problem has been non-textual interpretations, this time,
of the introductory clause conditions.
The introductory clause or chapeau of Article XX is

intended to eliminate improper use of the general exceptions.
Therefore, as we mentioned before, it requires that measures must
not be applied in a manner which would constitute a means of
arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination between countries where

the same conditions prevail, or as a disguised restriction on
international trade. The Appellate Body has restrictively interpreted the chapeau to prevent the interference of general exceptions with other GATT rules. 5 1 The task of interpreting and
47 Appellate Body Report, European Communities--MeasuresAffecting Asbestos

and Asbestos- Containing Products, 7 172-174, WT/DSI35/AB/R (Mar. 12,
2001) [hereinafter E.C. Asbestos case]; Appellate Body Report, KoreaMeasures Affecting Imports of Fresh, Chilled and Frozen Beef 7 165-166,
WT/DSI61/AB/R, WT/DS169/AB/R (Dec. 11, 2000) (adopted Jan. 10, 2001);
Thai Cigarette case, supra note 33, 75.
48 E.C. Asbestos case, supra note 47,
172.
49 U.S.- Shrimp case, supra note 37,
136.
50 E.C. Asbestos case, supra note 47. For a study of this case,
see Irene
McConnell, The Asbestos Case at the World Trade Organization: The
Treatment of Public Health Regulations under the GeneralAgreement of Tariffs
and Trade 1994 and the Agreement on Technical Barriersto Trade, 10 TULSA J.
COMP. & INT'L L. 153 (2002).
5' Sanford E. Gaines, The Problem of Enforcing Environmental Norms in the
WTO and What To Do About It, 26 HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L. REv. 321, 337
(2003); Gaines, supra note 39.
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applying the chapeau is, it said, "essentially the delicate one of
locating and marking out a line of equilibrium between the right of
a Member to invoke an exception under Article XX and the rights
of the other Members under varying substantive provisions (e.g.,
Article XI) of the GATT 1994 ....

,,52 This is the same as saying

that an exception would not be justified unless it satisfies the
obligation from which it is trying to be exempted. As Donald M.
McRae points out, contrary to what the Appellate Body sustains,
the only limits of Article XX exceptions are clearly stated in
paragraphs (a) to (0) and in the preamble conditions. 53 The equilibrium called for by the Appellate Body is achieved by making the
exceptions available to all WTO Members.
Moreover, the Appellate Body has interpreted the chapeau
to include the non-textual permissibility condition, used by previous Panels to interpret paragraphs (b) and (g) in the context of
the GATT of 1947, when it stated that an unjustifiable discrimination is one that could have been "foreseen" and "was not merely
inadvertent or unavoidable. 54 In other cases, the Appellate Body
has observed that, if a Member state has not made serious efforts to
negotiate international agreements to protect the environmental
elements at issue with all the Member states that could be affected,
the measure would be unjustifiable.55 Even though the negotiating
requirement in this specific case was relevant to determine if the
measure constituted an unjustifiable discrimination, it should not
be extended to other cases since no reference to this negotiation
requirement is found in the chapeau.
The Appellate Body has also said that unjustifiable discrimination not only takes place when different commercial treatment
is given to countries where the same conditions prevail, it also
happens when the measure is not flexible, i.e. does not permit an
investigation to determine if the measure is adequate to the conditions prevailing in these exporting countries. 56 This reasoning does
not find support in the text of the chapeau either. Instead of saying
52

u.s.- Shrimp case, supra note 37,

159.

53 See McRae, supra note 39, at 227-30.
54 U.S. Gasoline case, supra note 34, at 28.
5 U.S.- Shrimp case, supra note 37, 172.
56 Id. 165.
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that the discrimination is justified because between the affected
countries different conditions prevail, the Appellate Body denies
justification of the measure precisely because it does not take into
account that between these countries different conditions do
prevail.57
Despite the fact that there is no legal obligation for the
Panels or the Appellate Body to follow previous interpretations of
the WTO rules, rarely ever are these norms read and applied in a
different way. This has lead one author to say that the DSB
follows de facto the stare decisis principle.5 8 Therefore, it is
possible that trade measures applied in an MEA context, if
challenged in the WTO, would have to face the same difficulties as
unilateral measures in order to be considered consistent with the
GATT; thus, obstructing international environmental protection
efforts and sustainable development.
However, some WTO Members believe that trade measures
in MEAs, if challenged in the DSB, have better chances than
unilateral measures to be considered 59consistent with WTO rules
because of their multilateral character.
C.

Is There a Preference for Multilateral Measures in the WTO?

The opinions of those who say that trade measures in MEAs
have a better chance than unilateral measures of being considered
57 Gaines, supra note 39, at 784-85.

58 Raj Bhala, The Myth about Stare Decisis and InternationalTrade Law (Part
One of a Trilogy), 14 AM. U. INT'L L. REV. 845, 937-38 (1998-1999); Raj
Bhala, The Power of the Past: Towards De Jure Stare Decisis in WTO
Adjudication (Part Three of a Trilogy), 33 GEO. WASH. INT'L L. REV. 873, 87378 (2001).

59 WTO Ministerial Conference, Sing., Report of the WTO Committee on Trade
and Environment,

174, WT/CTE/1 (Nov. 12, 1996) [hereinafter CTE Report

1996]; Submission by New Zealand to the Committee on Trade and
Environment, The Relationship Between the Provisions of the Multilateral
Trading System and Trade Measures for Environmental Purposes, Including
Those Pursuant to Multilateral Environmental Agreements (MEAs),
20, 73,

74, 80, 89-97 WT/CTE/W/20 (Feb. 15, 1996) [hereinafter New Zealand's
submission to the CTE]. See also Joanne Scott, International Trade and
Environmental Governance: Relating Rules (and Standards) in the EU and the
WTO, 15 EUR. J. INT'L L. 307, 338-39 (2004).
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consistent with WTO rules are based essentially on two arguments.
On the one hand is the preference for measures based on international consensus over unilateral measures to face transboundary or
global environmental problems that was expressed in Principle 12 of
the Rio Declaration on Environment and Development and
confirmed by Panels and the Appellate Body. On the other hand,
the Committee on Trade and Environment (CTE) has been studying
the relationship between WTO rules and specific trade obligations in
MEAs to determine if it is necessary to modify any of the provisions
60
of the multilateral trading system to avoid conflicts in this area.
Although these arguments are surely a source of hope, there are
reasons to think that, in the best of cases, these opinions would
prove to be only partially true.
Principle 12 of the Rio Declaration provides in relevant part:
Trade policy measures for environmental purposes should not
constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination or a
disguised restriction on international trade. Unilateral actions to
deal with environmental challenges outside the jurisdiction of the
importing country should be avoided. Environmental measures
addressing transboundary or global environmental problems
61
should, as far as possible, be based on an international consensus.
Measures based on international consensus are preferred to
unilateral ones because the latter could be used to protect national
producers from foreign competition arguing a false environmental
motivation, 62 although this is not always the case. Such protectionist measures go against sustainable development because they
hamper poor countries' development options. Given the fact that
poverty is one of the most important obstacles environmental protection has to face, one can say that protectionist restrictions affect

60

So far the CTE has made no significant or specific recommendations in that

regard. See John H. Knox, The Judicial Resolution of Conflicts Between Trade
and the Environment, 28 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. I, 27-28 (2004); Gregory C.
Shaffer, The World Trade Organization Under Challenge: Democracy and the
Law and Politics of the WTO's Treatment of Trade and Environment Matters,
25 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 1, 41-42 (2001).
6 Rio Declaration, supra note 2, princ. 12.
62 See Richard W. Parker, The Case for Environmental Trade Sanctions, 7
WIDENER L. SYMP.

J. 21,25-26 (2001).
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the environment as much as trade. 6 3 Although not all unilateral
measures have protectionist motivations, multilateral measures
allow less space for debate about their authentic environmental
character, and are therefore preferred.
The Principle 12 formulation was influenced by the US.Tuna/Dolphin I case, in which, one year before the Rio Conference, the Panel said that despite being GATT inconsistent,
measures aimed to induce changes in other countries'
environmental policies could only overcome the legality issues if,
instead of being adopted unilaterally (as the U.S. did in this case),
they were adopted jointly by the Contracting parties. 64 Once
formed, the WTO (the Appellate Body in the U.S- Shrimp/Turtles
case), after quoting Principle 12, concluded that the measure in
question was discriminatory and could not find justification in the
environmental exceptions of Article XX, since the importing
country had not made serious efforts to negotiate international
environmental agreements with all the WTO Members affected by
the import restriction. 65 Moreover, Malaysia, a country affected by
this restriction, initiated additional proceedings based on Article
21.5 of the Dispute Settlement Understating (DSU), 66 arguing that

the U.S. was not following Appellate Body recommendations
which ordered the U.S. to bring the measure into conformity with
its trade commitments. In this proceeding the Panel said:

See Agenda 21, supra note 2,
2.19, 39.1(d); IISD/UNEP, supra note 12, at
4.
64 U.S.-Tuna/Dolphin I case, supra note 38, 6.4.
65 U.S.- Shrimp case, supra note 37,
171-72.
66 Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of
63

Disputes, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade
Organization, Annex 2, Legal Instruments-Results of the Uruguay Round, 33
I.L.M. 1125 (1994) [hereinafter DSU]. DSU's Article 21.5 states as follows:
Where there is disagreement as to the existence or consistency with a
covered agreement of measures taken to comply with the recommendations and
rulings such dispute shall be decided through recourse to these dispute
settlement procedures, including wherever possible resort to the original panel.
The panel shall circulate its report within 90 days after the date of referral of the
matter to it. When the panel considers that it cannot provide its report within this
time frame, it shall inform the DSB in writing of the reasons for the delay
together with an estimate of the period within which it will submit its report.
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[I]n a context such as this one where a multilateral
agreement is clearly to be preferred and where
measures such as that taken by the United States in
this case may only be accepted under Article XX if
they were allowed under an international agreement, or if they were taken further to the completion
of serious good
faith efforts to reach a multilateral
67
agreement ....

Although it is natural to interpret the above mentioned
decisions as a vote favoring multilateralism from the DSB, some
legal and contextual aspects in which they were pronounced
suggests avoiding any categorical conclusion in this regard. First,
it is important to emphasize that despite the international
preference for multilateral measures over unilateral ones, the WTO
rules make no formal distinction between these two types of
measures. For that reason, there are no guarantees that multilateral
measures, if brought to the DSB, would have a better chance than
unilateral measures to be declared GATT consistent. For its part,
being a soft law norm, i.e. non-binding, Principle 12 of the
Rio
68
Declaration does not guarantee anything in that regard either.
Furthermore, a careful reading of the facts in the US Shrimp/Turtle case show that the Appellate Body was not trying to
establish a preference for multilateral options, but was merely
trying to avoid what it thought was unjustified discrimination
contrary to Article XX's introductory clause. In that case, the
trade restriction was based on U.S. Section 609 of Public Law 101162 ("Section 609,,)69 which called upon the United States

Secretary of State to initiate negotiations with all foreign
governments engaged in fishing operations that could affect sea
turtles adversely, for the purpose of entering into bilateral and
multilateral treaties with such countries to protect that species.70
67

Panel Report, United States-Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and

Shrimp Products, Recourse to Article 21.5 by Malaysia, 5.88, WT/DS58/RW

(June 15, 2001) [hereinafter Malaysia Recourse to Article 21.5].

Kuei-Jung Ni, Contemporary Prospectsfor the Application of Principle 12 of
the Rio Declaration,14 GEO. INT'L ENVTL. L. REV. 1, 18-19 (2001).
69 16 U.S.C. § 1537 (1989).
70 U.S.- Shrimp case, supra note 37,
167, 172.
68
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The U.S. representatives negotiated seriously with some, but not
other, Members (including the appellees) that exported shrimp to
the United States and that were engaging in activities endangering
sea turtles. Therefore, the Appellate Body concluded that the
measure constituted an unjustified discrimination. 7' It is hard to
imagine that the Appellate Body's supposed vote favoring multilateralism would have been pronounced at all if the U.S. Section
609 Law, instead of requesting the initiation of negotiations with
all countries engaged in activities with an adverse effect on sea
turtles, would have, for instance, demanded that the Secretary of
State provide financial aid to all these countries. In this hypothetical case, the Appellate Body would have had to determine if
the measure constituted an unjustified discrimination, analyzing
whether all countries had received the financial aid called upon by
the U.S. law. Seen in this way, the Appellate Body's preference
for multilateral measures seems to have had more an incidental
rather than intentional character.7 2
Moreover, the findings of the Panel in the Article 21.5
proceedings requested by Malaysia in the context of the US.Shrimp/Turtle case, where the Panel said that in this context only
measures allowed under an international agreement, or taken after
having undergone serious efforts to negotiate one, could be
accepted under Article XX, could hardly influence future interpretations of Article XX because this reasoning is only applicable to
that particular case. Proceedings under Article 21.5 of the Dispute
Settlement Understating (DSU) can be initiated if there is disagreement as to the existence or consistency with trade obligations
of measures taken to comply with the recommendations and

71

Id.

169, 171-72.

72

These arguments find additional support if we consider that, as the Appellate

Body admits, the measure examined in this case aimed at the preservation of an
endangered species protected by one of the MEAs with more contracting parties,
CITES, which was binding on all the WTO members involved in the dispute and
included trade measures as its main protection instrument. However, CITES
only controls trade on species themselves and does not have trade obligations
applicable to processes and production measures even if they threaten the
survival of the species it tries to protect. See CITES, supra note 16;

Shrimp case, supra note 37,

135 n.121.

U.S.-
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rulings of the DSB. 73 In the US.-Shrimp/Turtle case the Appellate
Body recommended that the U.S. bring its measures into conformity with its trade obligations. In other words, the Appellate Body
requested the elimination, among other things, of the unjustified
discrimination produced by the fact that the U.S. negotiated
international agreements with some countries, but not with others.
It is natural and logical, for this reason, that the Panel concluded
that, in this context, the measure could only have been justified
under Article XX if it had been authorized by an international
agreement or if it had been taken after having undergone serious
efforts to negotiate one. In the hypothetical case, for instance, the
Appellate Body would have recommended the elimination of
unjustified U.S. discrimination produced by some countries, and
not others receiving financial aid. In case such a thing had been
requested by Section 609 Law, then the Panel would have had to
say that in this context the trade measure could only be justified
under Article XX if all countries had received the financial aid,
since the Panel's function is to ensure consistency with the covered
agreements of measures taken to comply with the DSB
recommendations.
Now, even if multilateral measures are truly preferred in
the WTO and thus have a good chance of being declared GATT
consistent if challenged in the DSB, not all trade measures that
could be adopted in an MEA context would benefit from this
preference. 74 This is due to the fact that some of these measures,
although adopted in an MEA context, might have a unilateralist
overtone.75 For instance, third party measures aimed to induce
cooperation are, from a third party perspective, unilateral.76 By the
same token, non-specific authorized measures, even when they are
applied between two WTO Members that are contracting parties in
a MEA, could imply some degree of unilateralism. The freedom to
choose the trade measure without the need to ask the consent of the
Member that might be affected, the fact that its adoption is not
DSU, supra note 67, art. 21.5.
Demaret, supra note 14, at 59.
See Charnovitz, supra note 7, at 44-45.
76 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 34, May 23, 1969, 1155
U.N.T.S. 331 [hereinafter Vienna Convention].
73
74
75
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discussed in an international forum, and the lack of international
control involves, at least, some degree of unilateralism.77
Indeed, the current Doha Declaration mandate of the CTE
could lead one to think that, in the face of an eventual dispute, not
all measures that can be adopted in the context of a MEA would
receive the same treatment by the DSB. At the Doha's Ministerial
Conference, WTO Members agreed to launch a new round of
multilateral negotiations, known as the Development Round for its
development goals, where the potential conflict between MEAs
and WTO rules was implicitly recognized.78 To prevent these
conflicts, Paragraph 31(1)(i) of the Doha Declaration mandates
Members to negotiate on the relationship between WTO rules and
specific trade obligations set out in MEAs. The specific obligations referred to by the Doha Declaration are, as pointed out above,
trade measures explicitly required and individually identified in an
MEA. Therefore, non-specific authorized measures in MEAs and
measures whose adoption has been recommended by the
administrative institutions of the agreement fall outside the scope
of the Doha Mandate. In addition, this mandate does not include
measures, which could be specific trade obligations, if they are
applied between Members of the WTO where one is not a
contracting party in the MEA.7 9
It is clear that not all measures that can be applied in a
MEA context are seen as a true manifestation of multilateralism, at
least not to the WTO. Thus, even if there is a preference for multilateral measures in the WTO, one cannot expect all MEA measures
to benefit from this preference if brought to the DSB. Moreover, it
is natural to think that potential controversies involving MEAs and
WTO rules would most likely arise as a result of the application of
a MEA's measure with a unilateral overtone, exactly the kind of
measure not covered by the Doha Mandate. Therefore, it is clear
that even the most faithful completion of the Doha Mandate is still
77 Demaret, supra note 14, at 56.
78

World Trade Organization, Ministerial Declaration of 14 November 2001,

31.1,

WT/MIN(01)/DEC/1,

41

I.L.M.

746

(2002)

[hereinafter

Doha

Declaration].
79 The CTE has not suggested any modification of the WTO rules to avoid
possible negative interactions with MEAs. See CTE Report 1996, supra note 59;
Zealand's submission to the CTE, supra note 59; Scott, supra note 59.
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far from solving the most contentious
possible interactions
80
rules.
WTO
and
MEAs
between
In summary, the preference for multilateral measures over
unilateral ones to deal with international environmental problems,
expressed in Principle 12 of the Rio Declaration and confirmed by
the DSB, does not guarantee that trade measures included in MEAs
would pass a GATT-consistent legality examination, if that
moment ever arrives. At the present time, the potential outcome of
a multilateral measure's legality examination depends solely on the
way in which the DSB interprets WTO rules, in particular the
environmental exceptions of GATT Article XX.
Obviously, all the comments expressed so far would not
have any practical relevance if the DSB of the WTO is not
requested to adjudicate MEA-WTO disputes. In case a controversy involving the WTO and a MEA arises, the dispute settlement
mechanisms of MEAs and the WTO would probably be equally
competent to resolve it because according to general Public
international law, both MEAs and the WTO are international
treaties with identical legal value, and thus both have the same
binding force. 8 1 Then, the question that needs to be answered is: in
which judicial body, MEA or WTO, would multilateral restrictions
related disputes most likely be adjudicated?
D.

The "vis atractiva"of the WTO's DSB

There is no international tribunal with general compulsory
jurisdiction to adjudicate all the potential disputes for breach of
public international law. 82 However, there are an important
80

CENTER FOR INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW ET AL., COLLECTIVE

COMMENTS RE: DOHA MINISTERIAL DECLARATION,

1, 17 (2002), http://www.

ciel.org/Publications/DohaComments_250ct02.pdf
81

Michael Akehurst, The Hierarchy of Sources of International Law, 47

BRITISH YB INT'L.

L. 273, 273-85 (1974-75).

The International Court of Justice cannot, for instance, exercise its jurisdiction
in relation to one State without its consent. See Statute of the International Court
of Justice art. 36.2, June 26, 1945, 59 Stat. 1055, available at http://www.icjcij.org/icjwww/ibasicdocuments/ibasictext/ibasicstatute.htm (last visited Dec.
20, 2007) [hereinafter ICJ Statute]. For a study of the causes of the proliferation
of international judicial bodies, see Firew Kebede Tiba, What Caused the
82
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number of dispute resolution and enforcement mechanisms with
83

jurisdiction on specific branches of public international law.

Moreover, there might be instances where two adjudicating bodies
have overlapping jurisdiction; i. e., two tribunals can settle a
dispute between the same parties and on the same matter.8 4 This
legal phenomenon, known as forum shopping, could occur if a
Member of the WTO applies a trade measure to products of
another WTO Member to achieve the environmental objectives of
an MEA (if both states are contracting parties to the environmental
agreement). In such a case, the affected state could request that the
matter be decided either by the WTO's DSB or, if it exists, the
MEA's adjudicating mechanism or both. 85 There is precedent of
an international dispute involving some commercial and environmental aspects between the European Community and Chile, the

Multiplicity of International Courts and Tribunals?, 10 GONZ. J. INT'L L. 202
(2006).
83 For example, the Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes
Between States and Nationals of Other States (ICSID), Nov. 12, 1959, 12 U.S.T.
110, 404 U.N.T.S. 259; the Statute of the International Tribunal for the Law of
the Sea, 1833 U.N.T.S. 3, Annex VI; the Rome Statute of the International
Criminal Court, July 17, 1998, U.N. Doc. 32/A/CONF. 183/9, 37 I.L.M. 999;
the WTO's DSB, supra note 66; etc. The effects in the unity of international law
caused by the proliferation of international tribunals have generated some
concerns among scholars. See generally Jonathan 1. Charney, Is International
Law Threatened by Multiple InternationalTribunals, 271 RECUEIL DES COURS
101 (1988); Benedict Kingsbury, Foreword: Is the Proliferationof International
Courts and Tribunals a Systemic Problem?, 31 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 679
(1999); Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, Justice as Conflict Resolution: Proliferation,
Fragmentation, and Decentralization of Dispute Settlement In International
Trade, 27 U. PA. J. INT'L ECON. L. 273, 280-81 (2006).
84 See YUVAL SHANY,

THE COMPETING JURISDICTIONS OF INTERNATIONAL

COURTS AND TRIBUNALS 130-31 (2003); Joost Pauwelyn, Going Global,
Regional, or Both? Dispute Settlement in the Southern African Development
Community (SADC) and Overlaps with the WTO and Other Jurisdictions, 31
MINN. J. GLOBAL TRADE 231, 246-47 (2004); Cesare P.R. Romano, The
Proliferationof International Judicial Bodies: The Pieces of the Puzzle, 31
N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 709, 727 (1999).
85 Gabrielle Marceau, Conflicts of Norms and Conflicts of Jurisdictions: The
Relationship Between the WTO Agreement and MEAs and Other Treaties, 35 J.
WORLD TRADE 1081, 1082 (2001); Jane I. Yoon, Note, The World Trade
Organization: Environmental Police?, 9 CARDOZO J. INT'L & COMP. L. 201,
219 (2001).
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Chile - Swordfish case, in which the DSB and the International
Tribunal of the Law of the Sea were called upon to settle the same
controversy, although these adjudicating bodies did not have time
to pronounce a definitive resolution because the parties reached 86an
agreement leading to the suspension of the judicial proceedings.
Although in the CTE's opinion WTO-MEA controversies
should be decided by the MEA's adjudicating body, 87 the Chile Swordfish case proves that it is incorrect to assume, as some WTO
Members do, 88 that states that have adopted an environmental
agreement would not resort to the WTO's DSB to resolve a
difference regarding a trade measure adopted in the MEA
context.8 9 As a matter of fact, there are reasons to believe that,
86

The European Community (EC), following a request by Spain, protested

because their fishing fleets operating in the Pacific Ocean, according to a
Chilean law, could not unload swordfish in Chilean ports. Thus, the EC
complained that Chile made the transit of swordfish through its ports impossible.
On December 12 th 2000, the EC requested the formation of a Panel in the WTO
arguing violation of GATT Articles V and XI. See Panel Report, ChileMeasures Affecting the Transit and Importation of Swordfish, WT/DS193/1
(Apr. 26, 2000) [hereinafter Chile - Swordfish case]. Chile, for its part, solicited
the International Tribunal of the Law of the Sea to decide if the EC was
fulfilling its obligations according to the United Nations Law of the Sea
Convention Articles 64, 116, 119 and 300. See Conservation and Sustainable
Exploitation of Swordfish Stocks in the South-Eastern Pacific Ocean (Chile v.
Eur. Cmty), Case No. 7 (Int'l Trib. L. of the Sea 2001). In March 2001, the EC
and Chile agreed to suspend the constitution of the WTO Panel (this agreement
was reiterated in November 2003). In the same month, the parties informed the
International Tribunal of the Law of the Sea that they had a provisional agreement and requested suspension of the proceedings. The EC and Chile have
addressed various letters to the Special Chamber of the International Tribunal
for the Law of the Sea formed to deal with the above-mentioned case requesting
in each occasion to continue the suspension of the proceedings for a further year.
The most recent letters of the EC and Chile are dated 6 and 15 November 2007,
respectively. See Conservation and Sustainable Exploitation of Swordfish
Stocks in the South-Eastern Pacific Ocean (Chile v. Eur. Cmty), Case No. 7,
Order 2007/3 (Nov. 30, 2007) (Int'l Trib. L. of the Sea 2007).
87 CTE Report 1996, supra note 59,
178.
88 New Zealand's submission to the CTE, supra note 59, at 45.
89 Philip Bender, Trade Restrictionsfor Antarctic Conservation Under the Free
Trade Principles of the WTO System, 14 SE. ENVTL. L.J. 163, 219 (2006)
("Although proceedings in the two different fora were subsequently suspended,
the very existence of this case highlights the potential conflict between the WTO
and other international institutions.").
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despite their equal legal value, some differences in the degree of
institutionalization between these normative systems would most

probably favor a major normative influence of the WTO's DSB.
WTO Members have consented ex ante to the DSB juris-

diction on all disputes arising under so called covered agreements,
which includes the GATT, 90 and have formally agreed to resort to

it each time they want to seek the redress of a violation of
obligations or other nullification or impairment of benefits under
these agreements. 9' Thus, on every occasion covered agreements
could be affected, i.e. by the application of a multilateral measure,
WTO Members will be entitled to initiate proceedings in the
DSB.

92

This is not the case when a State wants to seek redress for

breach of an international environmental norm. 93 Given the nature
of environmental obligations, dispute resolution in the MEA
context is less contentious than in the WTO. 94 As the International
Court of Justice (ICJ) once said, "in the field of environmental

protection, vigilance and prevention are required on account of the
often irreversible character of damage to the environment and of
90

The so called "covered agreements" are listed in Appendix 1 to DSU, which

includes, among others: the WTO agreement, GATT, General Agreement on
Trade in Services (GATS), Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual
Property Rights (TRIPS). See DSU, supra note 67, at 1226, 1244.
9'id. arts. 1, 2, 23.1.
92 This is relevant since the normative influence of the WTO's rules reach
practically any regulation affecting trade. JOOST PAUWELYN, CONFLICT OF
NORMS IN PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW: How WTO LAW RELATES TO OTHER
RULES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 20 (2003).

9'International environmental law does not have an institution like the WTO to
coordinate and apply the more than one thousand treaties that, in a decentralized
fashion and with variations in the number of States parties, directly or indirectly,
regulate environmental concerns. L. SANCHEZ DE MUNIAN, LA ORGANIZACION
MUNDIAL DEL COMERCIO (OMC) Y LA PROTECCION DEL MEDIO AMBIENTE

[ASPECTOS JURiDICOS] 31 (2000); F. PAOLILLO, Fuentes y Evoluci6n del
Derecho Internacional del Medio
Ambiente,
Vol.
II
CURSOS
EUROMEDITERRANEOS BANCAJA DE DERECHO INTERNACIONAL 362 (1998).
94 See generally Christine Chinkin, Alternative Dispute Resolution under

InternationalLaw, in REMEDIES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW: THE INSTITUTIONAL
DILEMMA 123, 124-28 (Malcolm D. Evans ed., 1998); Maglosia A. Fitzmaurice,
International Protection of the Environment, 293 RECUEIL DES COURS 336
(2001); RODRIGO, supra note 20; Raidiger Wolfrum, Means of Ensuring
Compliance with and Enforcement of International Environmental Law, 272
RECUEIL DES COURS 25 (1998).
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the limitations inherent in the very mechanism of reparation of this
type of damage." 95 As a result of this, contentious proceedings in
MEAs have a residual character and dispute avoidance mechanisms that tend to facilitate fulfillment of contracting parties'
obligations are preferred.96 Given its compulsory and exclusive
jurisdiction, the DSB of the WTO has an "institutional comparative
advantage" in relation to MEAs' adjudicating bodies, which most
probably will draw conflicts
into the realm of WTO disputes
97
regimes.
these
involving
As we observed before, whether a multilateral measure is
compatible with GATT rules would depend on how the trade
obligations are applied and interpreted by the DSB, in particular
GATT Article XX.98 Here, the role that non-WTO rules, such as
MEAs, can play in the DSB grows in importance in the MEAWTO relationships and thus in sustainable development. The next
section of this article examines the role that MEAs can play in the
DSB of the WTO. Part II examines the thesis of those authors that
affirm that international norms, such as MEAs, could be considered applicable law in the DSB. This approach has important
limitations as a solution to the MEAs and WTO rules. Part III will
analyze whether MEAs can be taken into account to interpret WTO
rules.
II.

MEAs AS APPLICABLE LAW IN THE WTO

The role that the DSB would give to other non-WTO
norms, such as MEAs, could be erroneously associated to another
99
question: whether or not the WTO is a self-contained regime.
95 Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Project (Hung. V. Slovk.), 1997 I.C.J. 7, at 78,
96

140.

See Chinkin, supra note 94; Fitzmaurice, supra note 94; RODRIGO, supra note

20; Wolfrum, supra note 94.
97 PABLO ZAPATERO, DERECHO DEL COMERCIO GLOBAL
98 Here it is important to emphasize that the DSB of

470-71 (2003).

the WTO does not have
jurisdiction to declare the illegality of a MEA regarding their trade obligations,
not even if a MEA's obligations are in direct contradiction with the WTO rules.
The DSB only has jurisdiction to resolve the legality of trade restrictions
adopted by WTO members; the fact that a measure is adopted by one WTO
member to favor a MEA's objectives does not limit the DSB's jurisdiction.
99 United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran (U.S. v. Iran), 1980
I.C.J. 3, 40 (May 24) [hereinafter U.S. v. Iran Diplomatic Staff case]. The term
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Therefore, it is convenient to begin this section with an
examination of this issue.
A.

Is the WTO a Self-Contained Regime?

The international obligations of States derive from international treaties or general international law. 00 Treaties are binding
on State parties only and belong to the realm of what the doctrine

calls particular international law; while general international law,
integrated by customary law and general principles of law, is
binding on all States.' 0 ' There is no hierarchy between treaties and
general international law (with the possible exception ofjus cogens
norms); 10 2 on the contrary, both norms have the same binding
"self-contained"

regime, which is the degree of independence of some
normative system in relation to other rules of international law, was used for the
first time by the Permanent Court of International Justice (PCIJ) in the
Wimbledon case. See S.S. Wimbledon (Brit., Fr., Italy & Japan v. Ger.), 1923
P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 1, at 24 (Aug. 17) [hereinafter Wimbledon case]. Once the
ICJ was formed, this term was used in the U.S. v. Iran DiplomaticStaffcase. For
a study of the notion of "self-contained regimes," see P. J. Kuyper, The Law of
GA TT as a Special Field of InternationalLaw: Ignorance,further refinement or
self-containedsystem of internationallaw?, 25 NETH. Y.B. INT'L L. 227 (1994);
Anja Lindroos & Michael Mehling, Dispelling the Chimera of 'Self-Contained
Regimes' International Law and the WTO, 16 EUR. J. INT'L L. 857 (2005);
Bruno Simma & Dirk Pulkowski, Of Planets and the Universe: Self-Contained
Regimes in InternationalLaw, 17 EUR. J. INT'L L. 483 (2006); Pablo Zapatero,

Sistemas juridicos especiales, LVII REVISTA ESPAN4OLA DE DERECHO
INTERNACIONAL 187-207 (2005); B. Simma, Self-contained regimes, 16 NETH.
Y.B. INT'L L. 111 (1985).
Vienna Convention, supra note 76, arts. 34, 38.
101Id The separation of public international law in general (binding on all States
100

of the International Community) and particular (binding only on some States)
has its origins in Article 38.1(a) of the Statute of the International Court of
Justice, which differentiates between general and particular treaties. See ICJ
Statute, supra note 82, art. 38.1(a). Nevertheless, in Oriol Casanovas' opinion,
since a great variety of relations could be established through treaties, this
separation seems simplistic. This author suggests the incorporation of the notion
of "international regimes" as a conceptual basis for the analysis of Particular
International law, understating this concept as the international agreements
regulating States actions in a concrete sphere. ORIOL CASANOVAS, UNITY AND
PLURALISM IN PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 56-57 (2001).
102 According to the Vienna Convention's Article 53, a peremptory norm of
general international law, i.e. a jus cogens norm, is "a norm accepted and
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force. 10 3 As a result of this, States can create a treaty substituting
or contracting out a norm of general public law or, likewise, give
birth to a custom substituting a treaty norm. 10 4 There are, nevertheless, at least two limitations: an imperative norm ofjus cogens
cannot be substituted except with another norm equally imperative
10 5
and third State rights cannot be affected without their consent.
In addition, the intention of the negotiating parties to substitute or
contract out an international norm must be demonstrated since,
although it would be excessive to say that an express declaration in
there is a presumption against derogation
that regard is necessary,
06
law.1
of international
In past years, some sectors of the doctrine have questioned
to what extent the States' freedom to substitute or contract out
international law may lead to its fragmentation. 107 In other words,

recognized by the international community of States as a whole as a norm from
which no derogation is permitted and which can be modified only by a
subsequent norm of general international law having the same character."
Vienna Convention, supra note 76, art. 53. See also Levan Alexidze, Legal
Nature of Jus Cogens in Contemporary InternationalLaw, 172 RECUEIL DES
COURs 219, 262-63 (1981); Dinah Shelton, Normative Hierarchy in
InternationalLaw, 100 AM. J.INT'L L. 291, 297-301 (2006); J.H.H. Weiler &
Andreas L. Paulus, The Structure of Change in InternationalLaw or Is There a
Hierarchyof Norms in InternationalLaw?, 8 EUR. J. INT'L L. 545, 550 (1997).
103Akehurst, supra note 81, at 273.
104 E. Vranes sustains that Merkl and Kelsen were correct when they asserted
that the authorization to derogate international law had to be positively stipulated. However, this scholar observes that nowadays this authorization is
implicitly included in the authorization to create law, as an inherent result of the
fundamental principle of State sovereignty. Erich Vranes, Lex Superior, Lex
Specialis, Lex Posterior - Zur Rechtsnatur der "Konfliktlosungsregeln," 65
HEIDELBERG J.INT'L L. 391 (2005).
105 Vienna Convention, supra note 76, arts. 34, 53. See also International Law
Commission, Conclusions of the work of the Study Group on the Fragmentation
of International Law: Difficulties arising from the Diversification and
Expansion of InternationalLaw, 10, A/61/10, 251, (2006) [hereinafter ILC's
Conclusions on the Fragmentation of International Law].
106 Report of the Int'l Law Comm'n, U.N. GOAR, 59th Sess., ch. X, 328, U.N.
Doc. A/59/10 [hereinafter ILC Fragmentation of International Law]. See also
PAUWELYN, supra note 92, at 236.
107 Id See also U.S. v. Iran Diplomatic Staff case, 1980 I.C.J. 3, 40 (May 24);
Wimbledon case, 1923 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. I, at 24 (Aug. 17); Kuyper, supra
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they question if it is possible to create subsystems of law totally

impermeable to norms belonging to the general system of public
international law. 0 8 The notion of self-contained regimes is
frequently used as conceptual basis for this debate over the unity of
international law. 10 9 This concept, and the debate created around
it, have influenced the way in which some authors see the WTOMEA interactions, since some of them perceive the WTO as a selfcontained regime. This erroneously leads them to exclude the
possibility of considering other norms of international law in the
WTO. l l0

The self-contained regime notion has been used in three
different ways by doctrine and international jurisprudence: a) in
the context of two dispositions in the same treaty regulating the
same subject matter with different degrees of specificity;"' b)
giving primacy to secondary rules 112 over general international law
note 99; Lindroos & Mehling, supra note 99; Simma & Pulkowski, supra note
99; Zapatero, supra note 99; Simma, supranote 99.
10' In 0. Casanovas words, "[t]he question is whether these international regimes
constitute legal systems, which may be different to and autonomous with regard
to general International Law itself, or whether they are normative subsystems
which develop within the general framework of the international legal system."
CASANOVAS, supra note 101, at 66.
109 See U.S. v. Iran Diplomatic Staff case, 1980 I.C.J. at 40; Wimbledon case,
1923 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 1, at 24; Kuyper, supra note 99; Lindroos & Mehling,
supra note 99; Simma & Pulkowski, supra note 99; Zapatero, supra note 99;
Simma, supra note 99.
11o See, e.g., Joel P. Trachtman, The Domain of WTO Dispute Resolution, 40
HARV. INT'L L.J. 333, 342 (1999).

...
The PCIJ in the Wimbledon case concluded that the dispositions in the Treaty
of Versailles regulating the Kiel Canal, a German internal waterway, had the
attribute of being "self-contained" since they need not be supplemented or
interpreted with the help of other dispositions in the same treaty regulating
German internal waterways in general. The PCIJ considered that if the more
general rules were applied to the Kiel Canal, the specific norms of the latter
would loose their "raison d'etre." See Wimbledon case, 1923 P.C.I.J. (ser. A)
No. 1, at 23-24.
112The division of the norms of the international legal system in primary and
secondary rules is owed to H.L.A. Hart. Primary rules are duty-imposing, i.e.
they impose obligations to do or to abstain from certain actions. Secondary rules
regulate primary rules through norms of recognition, norms of change, and rules
of adjudication. Secondary rules of recognition contain the parameters to
identify which rules belong to the system; rules of change contain the proce-
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in case of breach of a norm part of a subsystem of public
international law;' 13 and c) to make reference to a branch of
international law with some specific principles, objectives and
institutions.' 14
For the International Law Commission (ILC), self-contained regimes are a subspecies of a lex specialis that is applied
instead of a general norm, given that it reflects more clearly States
intentions.1 15 In the ILC's opinion, general international law
remains below the specialized regimes. Moreover, it affirms that if
a special norm deviates from general international law, the
application of the latter is not for that reason excluded; rather, it
remains effective on a secondary plane, providing the subsystem
with a normative base, fulfilling its legal vacuums and applying

dures with which primary rules can be modified, substituted or eliminated; and
rules of adjudication serve to identify when a primary rule is violated and the
procedure that must be followed in consequence. Cf H.L.A. HART, THE
CONCEPT OF LAW 81, 105-10 (2d ed. 1994). See also Stephen Perry, Hart on
Social Rules and the Foundationsof Law: Liberating the InternalPoint of View,
75 FORDHAM L. REV. 1171, 1189-90 (2006); K.C. Wellens, Diversity in
secondary rules and the unity of internationallaw: some reflections on current
trends, 25 NETH. Y.B. INT'L L. 3, 7 (1994).
13 The ICJ in the U.S. v. Iran Diplomatic Staff case said that diplomatic law
constitutes a self-contained regime because it "on the one hand, lays down the
receiving State's obligations regarding the facilities, privileges and immunities
to be accorded to diplomatic missions and, on the other, foresees their possible
abuse by members of the mission and specifies the means at the disposal of the
receiving State to counter any such abuse." U.S. v. Iran Diplomatic Staff case,
1980 I.C.J. at 40.
114The International Law Commission (ILC) has observed that the notion of a
"self-contained regime" is often used to make reference to a whole field of
functional specialization, in the sense that special rules and techniques of
interpretation and administration are thought to apply (e.g. in fields such as
"human rights law," "WTO law," and "European law/EU law"). See Study
Group of the Int'l Law Comm'n, 58th Sess., Fragmentation of International
Law: Difficulties Arising from the Diversification and Expansion of
InternationalLaw, 129, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/L.682 (Apr. 13, 2006) (finalized by
Martti Koskenniemi) [hereinafter ILC's Final Report on Fragmentation of
International Law].
1'5 ILC's Conclusions on the Fragmentation of International Law, supra note
105, II.
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when the special norms fail. 1 6 Hence, no self-contained regime
could be considered hermetically closed in relation to other norms
The Appellate Body accepted that
of international law.' 17
international law has a role to play in the trade regime when it said,
"the General Agreement is not to be read in clinical isolation from
public international law."" 8 Therefore, to know what role other
norms, such as MEAs, might have in the WTO the issue to be
address is not whether the WTO is a self-contained regime.1 19
Instead, the limits of the DSB substantive jurisdiction and its
applicable law need to be clarified.120 Some authors believe2 that in
'
both cases the limits are the so-called covered agreements.'

116

See ILC Fragmentation of International Law, supra note 106,

319. In the

ILC's opinion, "[w]hethear a regime has "failed" in this sense, however, would
have to be assessed above all by an interpretation of its constitutional
instruments." ILC's Conclusions on the Fragmentation of International Law,
supra note 105, at 412.
17 ILC's Final Report on Fragmentation of International Law, supra note 114, at
82. See also Duncan French, Treaty Interpretation and the Incorporation of
Extraneous Legal Rules, 55 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 281, 293 (2006) ("Though the
WTO disciplines arguably comprise, to a large extent, a self-contained regime,
this cannot be taken to mean absolute isolation from the rest of international
law."); Lindroos & Mehling, supra note 99, at 875.
118 U.S. Gasoline case, supra note 34, at 17.
119 As we explained before, if the notion of "self-contained regime" is interpreted as a system totally independent from other rules of international law, then
we can say that the WTO is not one. See Kuyper, supra note 99, at 257. In this
line of thought, John H. Jackson has said that the WTO is not a system
"hermetically sealed." John H. Jackson, Fragmentation or Unification Among
InternationalInstitutions: The World Trade Organization,31 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L.
& POL. 823, 828-29 (1999). On the other hand, if the notion of a "self-contained
regime" is interpreted as a system with special rules that had primacy over other
general rules of international law, without excluding the possibility that other
rules of international law might be applicable if the special system fails, then we
can say that the WTO is a "self-contained regime." See ILC Fragmentation of
International Law, supra note 106, 433. See also Simma & Pulkowski, supra
note 99, at 519-2 1.
120 Lindroos & Mehling, supra note 99, at 860.
121 DSU, supra note 67, at 1226, 1244.

2007]
B.

SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT
Applicable Law in the DSB

There is a difference between substantive jurisdiction and
applicable law of an international tribunal. The former makes
reference to the kind of claims that international tribunals can
adjudicate and the latter delimits the law that could be used as a
legal foundation for their decisions.' 2 2 In the WTO the substantive
jurisdiction of the DSB is limited to the covered agreements. 23
Unless the parties in a trade dispute agree otherwise, the mandate
of the Panels according to Article 7.1 of the DSU is
"[t]o examine, in the light of the relevant provisions
in (name of the covered agreement(s) cited by the
parties to the dispute), the matter referred to the
DSB by (name of party) in document ...and to
make such findings as will assist the DSB in
making the recommendations or in giving 124
the
agreement(s)."'
that/those
in
for
rulings provided
Thus, only a breach of the covered agreements or nullification or
impairment of benefits thereof 25 could be the legal basis to initiate
122

For instance, the ICJ statute makes a clear distinction between the substantive

jurisdiction of the Court (i.e. "all cases which the parties refer to it and all
matters specially provided for in the Charter of the United Nations or in treaties
and conventions in force") and the rules of international law that the Court shall
apply to decide the disputes brought before it (i.e. the various international law
rules listed in Article 38). See ICJ Statute, supra note 82, arts. 36, 38.
123 See DSU, supra note 67, art. 1,
at 1226.
124 DSU, supra note 67, art. 7.1, at 1231. Article 23 of the DSU states that to
"seek the redress of a violation of obligations or other nullification or
impairment of benefits under the covered agreements or an impediment to the
attainment of any objective of the covered agreements, [WTO members] shall
have recourse to, and abide by, the rules and procedures of this Understanding."
See DSU, supra note 67, art. 23.1, at 1241. Thus, the WTO's DSB has exclusive
jurisdiction to decide all the disputes related to the so-called "covered
agreements." Debra P. Steger, The Jurisdiction of the World Trade
Organization,98 AM. SOC'Y INT'L L. PROC. 142, 143 (2004).
125 The DSU contains a procedure to be followed when a measure applied by
one member nullifies or impairs the benefits of other members contained in the
covered agreements, even if WTO rules are not directly violated. DSU, supra
note 67, arts. 3.1, 3.3, 26, at 1227, 1242-43. For a study of this type of procedure
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an adjudicating proceeding in the DSB. 126 Nevertheless, it is
important to bear in mind that sometimes the covered agreements
incorporate or make reference to other norms of international law.
When incorporated in a covered agreement, other norms of
international law are, for practical matters, part of the covered
agreements and thus fall inside the substantive jurisdiction of the
DSB.127 In the case that the covered agreements make reference to
other norms of international law but do not incorporate them, the
latter cannot be the basis for a claim in the DSB; nonetheless,2 8they
could still serve to define or delimit a commercial obligation. 1
see Locknie Hsu, Non-violation Complaints-World Trade Organization Issues
and Recent Free Trade Agreements, 39 J. WORLD TRADE 205 (2005).
126 This has been confirmed by the Appellate Body in the case of European
Communities - Measures Affecting the Importation of Certain Poultry Products
where Brazil argued that, in addition to some GATT violations, the European
Community had violated the Oilseeds Agreement. Despite the fact that this
agreement had been adopted as part of the resolution of a GATT dispute and
with the authorization of the Contracting Parties as a compensatory adjustment
in conformity with GATT's Article XXVIII, the Appellate Body sustained the
previous holding that the Oilseeds Agreement was not part of the "covered
agreements," and thus was not relevant to the dispute in question. Nevertheless,
the Appellate Body concluded that the Oilseeds Agreement (a bilateral
agreement) in this specific case could be used as a complementary means of
interpretation of Schedule LXXX in conformity with Article 32 of the Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties, since it is part of the historical antecedents
of the European Communities' concessions. See Appellate Body Report,
European Communities-MeasuresAffecting the Importation of Certain Poultry
Products,
79, 83, WT/DS69/AB/R (July 23, 1998) [hereinafter EC-Poultry
case]; Vienna Convention, supra note 76, art. 32.
127 For instance, the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual
Property Rights incorporates a series of obligations contained in intellectual
property international agreements. See Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of
Intellectual Property Rights, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing
the World Trade Organization, Annex IC, Legal Instruments-Results of the
Uruguay Round, 33 I.L.M. 1125, arts. 2-3, 9, 10, 16, 19 (1994) [hereinafter
TRIPs agreement].
128 For instance, a waiver granted to the European Community made reference to
the Lomd Convention. The Appellative Body said that the Panel was correct in
stating "We note that since the GATT CONTRACTING PARTIES incorporated
a reference to the Lome Convention into the Lomd waiver, the meaning of the
Lomd Convention became a GATT/WTO issue, at least to that extent. Thus, we
have no alternative but to examine the provisions of the Lomd Convention
ourselves in so far as it is necessary to interpret the Lomd waiver." Appellate
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Since Article 7.1 of the DSU mandates Panels to examine,
in the light of the covered agreements cited by the parties, the
matter referred to the DSB, some authors sustain that this
disposition not only leaves non-WTO rules outside the substantive
jurisdiction of the DSB, but also outside the applicable law. This
line of thinking seems to find some support in other articles of the
DSU, where it is stated that the "Members recognize that [the
DSB] serves to preserve the rights and obligations of Members
under the covered agreements;" "recommendations and rulings of
the DSB cannot add to or diminish the rights and obligations
provided in the covered agreements;" and "recommendations or
rulings made by the DSB shall be aimed at achieving a satisfactory
settlement of the matter in accordance with ...the covered agree-

ments." 129 In Joel P. Trachtman's opinion, it would be strange that
with so many references to the covered agreements as applicable
law, the Members would seek to make other non-WTO rules
applicable law.' 30 In the same line of thinking, Pablo Zapatero
maintains that the above-mentioned articles of the DSU delimit the
applicable law and makes the incorporation of other non-WTO
rules difficult. 13 1 Gabrielle Marceau affirms that both the
applicable law and the substantive jurisdiction of the DSB is
limited to the covered agreements, something that in her opinion
can be interpreted as the establishment of a specific system of
that must be applied
applicable law; i. e. as a form of lex specialis
32
1
law.
international
of
norms
in lieu of other
Other scholars, for their part, disagree, and think that it is
wrong to say that international law, other than the covered
agreements, cannot be considered applicable law in the claims
brought before the DSB. Among these writers Joost Pauwelyn
stands out. This author asserts that the DSU does not specify in
any way what is the applicable law; therefore, in that regard no
Body Report, European Communities-Regimefor the Importation, Sale and
Distribution of Bananas, 167, WT/DS27/AB/R (Sept. 9, 1997) (adopted
Sept. 25, 1997) [hereinafter EC-Bananas case].
129DSU,

supra note 67, arts. 3.2-3.4.

130Trachtman, supra note 111, at 342.
131ZAPATERO,
132 Gabrielle

supra note 97, at 72.

Marceau, WTO Dispute Settlement and Human Rights, 13 EUR. J.
INT'L L. 753, 767 (2002).
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international rule law is excluded a priori.133 In his opinion, it
would be mistaken to interpret an explicit reference to the covered
agreements in Article 7.1 as an implicit exclusion of other norms
of international law.' 34 Furthermore, this author observes that in
order to be applicable in the WTO, an explicit confirmation of
international law is not necessary, because these rules are still in
force for the WTO, with the exception of those that have been
35
terminated or substituted by the covered agreements.'
Although this opinion seems to lean excessively on the fact
that the DSU does not use the word apply, as the ICJ statute does.
In its place, DSU mandates the Panels to examine the claims in the
light of the covered agreements; the thesis asserting that
international law might be applicable law in the WTO finds
support in some decisions of the DSB. For instance, the Panel in
the Korea-Measures Affecting Government Procurement case
said, "[w]e do not see any basis for arguing that the terms of
reference [Article 7.1] are meant to exclude reference to the
broader rules of customary international law in interpreting a claim
properly before the Panel.' 36 In view of the fact that the Panel
quoted Article 7.1, which identifies the limits of the DSB's
substantive jurisdiction-and according to some interpretations,
the applicable law-and not Article 11, which makes reference to
the role of international law in the interpretation of the covered
agreements, one could be led to believe that customary law has a
role to play in the DSB and not just as a means of interpreting the

Joost Pauwelyn asserts that all the references to the covered agreements in
the DSU are about the substantive jurisdiction of the DSB, and do not constrain
the applicable law. PAUWELYN, supra note 92, at 465. Other scholars come to
the same conclusion, although with different arguments. See David Palmeter &
Petros C. Mavroidis, The WTO Legal System: Sources of Law, 92 AM. J.INT'L
L. 398, 399 (1998). See also Lorand Bartels, Applicable Law in WTO Dispute
Settlement Proceedings,35 J. WORLD TRADE 499, 505 (2001) (maintaining that
nowhere in DSU's Article 7.1 can one read that the applicable law in the WTO
is limited to the covered agreements).
131PAUWELYN, supra note 92, at 469.
131Id at 465.
136 Panel Report, Korea-MeasuresAffecting Government
Procurement, 7.101
n.755, WT/DS163/R (May 1, 2000).
133

2007]

SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT

covered agreements.' 37 In addition, one study by James Cameron
and Kevin R. Gray shows that, despite not being mentioned in the
covered agreements, some general principles of international law,
such as the allocation of the burden of proof, the principle of
procedural economy, and the rights of action and
representation,
38
among others, have been used in WTO disputes.'
Given that there is no hierarchy between norms of
international law, with the possible exception of jus cogens, it
could be said that, just like general principles of law and customary
law, other international rules binding on WTO Members, for
instance some MEAs, might be applicable law to the DSB. Joost
Pauwelyn observes that one of the benefits of considering nonWTO rule applicable law would be that, in the case of conflict
between these norms and the covered agreements, the DSB would
have to resolve which of these rules prevail. In this way, the DSB
could ensure respect of the pacta sunt servanda principle by WTO
Members.139 In other words, it would restrain WTO Members from
This reasoning of the Panel seems to add support to Joost Pauwelyn's
argument in which he maintains that is wrong to interpret an explicit reference
to certain types of norms in Article 7.1 of the DSU (the "covered agreements")
as an implicit exclusion of other norms (international law other than the
"covered agreements"). See PAUWELYN, supra note 92, at 469.
138 James Cameron & Kevin R. Gray, Principles of International Law in
the
WTO Dispute Settlement Body, 50 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 248 (2001). Of
importance are that these rules of international law were applied because the
WTO system does not contain specific dispositions to address the question at
issue. In other words, these norms were not applied to clarify ambiguous
dispositions of the covered agreements. Take as an example the case United
States-Measures Affecting Imports of Woven Wool Shirts and Blouses from
India in which the Appellate Body, after stating that the DSU's Article 3.8
serves to determine which member must refuting the accusation but does not
serve to determine on which member the burden of proof lies, concluded that it
"is a generally-accepted canon of evidence in civil law, common law and, in fact,
most jurisdictions, that the burden of proof rests upon the party, whether
complaining or defending, who asserts the affirmative of a particular claim or
defence." See Appellate Body Report, United States-Measures Affecting
Imports of Woven Wool Shirts and Blouses from India, § IV, at 16,
WT/DS33/AB/R (Apr. 25, 1997) [hereinafter U.S. Blouses case].
139 This principle is codified in Article 26 of the Vienna Convention,
which
states that "[elvery treaty in force is binding upon the parties to it and must be
performed by them in good faith." See Vienna Convention, supra note 76, art.
26.
137
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hiding in the DSB to0 ignore their obligations acquired in other
international forums.14
The duty to examine if there are other non-WTO applicable
rules to trade disputes can be found, in Joost Pauwelyn's and other
authors' opinions, in Article 11 of the DSU. This article mandates
Panels to make an objective assessment of the applicability of the
relevant covered agreements, and "make such other findings as
will assist the DSB in making the recommendation or in giving the
rulings provided for in the covered agreements."' 14 1 Of importance
is that, only if there is a normative conflict-something that
requires two contradictory rules of law about the same subject
matter in force at the same time on one or more States-a Panel
would be required to examine the applicability of the two norms to
determine which one prevails. 142 Although there are no clear
criteria to resolve when two agreements are about the same subject
matter, it appears logical to say that if two rules of law can conflict
it is precisely because they are about the same matter. 143 Article
104 of the North America Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA)
contains a conflict clause in case of incompatibility between
NAFTA and specific trade obligations in MEAs listed in this
article. 44 The existence of this conflict clause demonstrates that
140 PAUWELYN,

supra note 92, at 38, 475.

Thomas J. Schoenbaum interprets Article 11 of the DSU as an "implied
powers" clause that confers implicit powers "which should be interpreted
broadly so that the panels and Appellate Body can decide all aspects of a
dispute," even if the determinate element is an international rule not part of the
covered agreements. Thomas J. Schoenbaum, WTO Dispute Settlement: Praise
and Suggestionsfor Reform, 47 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 647, 653 (1998).
142 In other words, if two agreements are about different
subject matters or are
not in force at the same time or do not oblige at least one State in common, a
normative conflict cannot arise, and, of course, there is no need to apply general
rules of conflict to determine which treaty prevails. See Christopher J. Borgen,
Resolving Treaty Conflicts, 37 GEO. WASH. INT'L L. REv. 573, 579-83 (2005).
143 ILC's Final Report on Fragmentation of International
Law, supra note 114,
22-23; Wolfram Karl, Treaties, Conflicts Between, in 7 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 468 (1984).
144 NAFTA's Article 104 in relevant part provides: "[i]n the event of
any
inconsistency between this Agreement and the specific trade obligations set out
in ... the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild
Fauna and Flora ... , the Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the
Ozone Layer ... the Basel Convention on the Control of Transboundary
141
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there might be instances where MEAs and international trade rules,
such as NAFTA's and the WTO's, could be considered to be about
the same matter. 145 Now, the sole fact that two agreements are
about the same matter, are binding at the same point in time and
have at least one contracting party in common does not necessarily
imply the existence of a conflict. In addition to this, for a conflict
to arise it should not be possible for one or more contracting
14 6
parties to comply at the same time with the two agreements.
In the event a conflict arises between covered agreements
and a MEA, the objective assessment of the applicability of the
covered agreements called for in Article 11 of the DSU would
have to be carried out by applying general international law
conflict rules.
Movements of Hazardous Wastes and Their Disposal ...; such obligations shall
prevail to the extent of the inconsistency ....
" North Atlantic Free Trade
Agreement art. 104, Can.-Mex.- U.S., Dec. 17, 1992, 32 I.L.M. 289, 297-98
(1994).
145Supporting the idea that MEA and WTO rules in certain cases are about the
same subject matter, see the ILC's Final Report on Fragmentation of
International Law, supra note 114,
21-26; Robert E. Hudec, GATT Legal
Restraints on the Use of Trade Measures against Foreign Environmental
Practices, in FAIR TRADE AND HARMONIZATION: PREREQUISITES FOR FREE
TRADE? 95, 121 (Jagdish Bhagwati & Robert E. Hudec eds., 1996); Chris Wold,
Multilateral Environmental Agreements and the GATT: Conflict and Resolution?, 26 ENVTL. L. 841, 911 (1996). But see DANIEL C. ESTY, GREENING THE
GATT: TRADE, ENVIRONMENT, AND THE FUTURE 219 (1994) (arguing that
MEAs and WTO are about different subject matters). Mario Melgar observes,
for his part, that the TRIMPs Agreement and the Convention on Biological
Diversity do not regulate the same matter, but that does not avoid possible
negative interaction between these agreements with the possible negative effects
for the environmental treaty. MARIO MELGAR, BIOTECNOLOGiA Y PROPIEDAD
INTELECTUAL: UN ENFOQUE INTEGRADO DESDE EL DERECHO INTERNACIONAL

291-292 (Universidad Nacional Aut6noma de Mdxico, 2005).
146 C. Wilfred Jenks, The Conflict of Law-Making Treaties, 30
BRIT. Y.B. INT'L
L. 401, 426 (1953); Emmanuel Roucounas, Engagements paralkles et contradictoires, 206 RECUEIL DES COURS 9 (1987). This interpretation of conflicts has
been applied by some Panels. Cf Panel Report, Indonesia-CertainMeasures
Affecting the Automobile Industry, 14.28 n.649, WT/DS54/R, WT/DS55/R,
WT/DS59/R, WT/DS64/R (July 2, 1998) [hereinafter Indonesia-Automobile
Industry case]. However, other authors disagree with this definition. Joost
Pauwelyn, for instance, maintains that two rules are in conflict if one
"constitutes, has led to, or may lead to, a breach of the other." PAUWELYN, supra
note 92, at 176 (italics omitted).
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C.
Limitations of Considering MEAs Applicable Law in the
WTO
Since Article 7.1 of the DSU limits the DSB's substantive
jurisdiction to the covered agreements, defenders of the idea that
international law might be applicable law in the WTO explain that
other non-WTO rules could be considered by the DSB only if they
are part of the legal arguments of the defendant and are binding on
the plaintiff as well.14 7 If this is the case and conflict rules are used
to examine the relationship between the covered agreements and
the other norms of international law cited by the defendant, the end
result of the dispute could be the non-application of those covered
agreements. This, in Joost Pauwelyn's opinion, does not mean that
Panels are going to enforce non-WTO rules or they are going to
diminish plaintiff rights in a way inconsistent with Articles 3.2 and
19.2 of the DSU. 148 In his opinion, if other rules prevail over the
covered agreements and if the rights of the plaintiff are in a degree
diminished, it is because this Member-not the Panel-on a
voluntary basis would have decided so by accepting the obligations
of the agreement overriding his trade commitments.' 4 9 In summary, if international law prevails over the covered agreements,
the former cannot be enforced by the DSB due to its lack of
substantive jurisdiction; nevertheless, the covered agreements
would not be enforced either because they would have been
invalidated, according to the relevant rules of conflict, by other
non-WTO rules cited by the defendant, and thus the plaintiff would
50
lose. 1
This approach provides a framework of study of interstate
relations that advocates for the unity of international law and the
respect of the pacta sunt servanda and pacta tertiis principles, but
147 Joost Pauwelyn, The Role of Public InternationalLaw in the WTO: How Far

Can We Go?, 95 AM. J. INT'L L. 535, 566-69 (2001).
148 In accordance with the DSU, "in their findings and recommendations, the
panel and Appellate Body cannot add to or diminish the rights and obligations
provided in the covered agreements." DSU, supra note 67, arts. 3.2, 19.2, at
1227, 1237.
149 PAUWELYN,

supra note 92, at 474.

150 d. at 473-474.
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as far as MEA and WTO disputes are concerned has limited
application at best.' 5' This is due to the fact that a MEA-WTO
normative conflict is improbable. Pursuant to the principle of
good-faith, a presumption against normative conflicts exists in
international law; therefore, at all times when two dispositions in a
possible conflict can be interpreted in a compatible or harmonious
way this interpretation must prevail. 152
Only when such
interpretation is not possible could conflicts arise.1 53 Although
WTO rules tend to prohibit trade barriers, trade measures applied
to protect the environment could, at least in theory, be exempted
from trade obligations through norms such as GATT Article
XX1 54 For their part, MEAs which include trade obligations,
regularly specify that this kind of measure must not result in
arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination and should not constitute a
disguised restriction on international trade, in identical terms to
Article XX's introductory clause. 155 It is clear then that MEAs and
WTO rules could almost always be interpreted in a harmonious
151

Joost Pauwelyn himself observes that "in most cases WTO law and other

international norms will provide sufficient exceptions and ambiguity so that the
two sets of norms can be interpreted in a harmonious manner (relying, for
example, on GATT Article XX exceptions when it comes to environmental
agreements), such leeway may not exist in other, exceptional circumstances and
the two norms may conflict, raising the need for a decision on which norm
prevails." Joost Pauwelyn, A Typology Of Multilateral Treaty Obligations: Are
WTO Obligations Bilateral Or Collective In Nature?, 14 EUR. J. INT'L L. 907,
946 (2003).
152 Akehurst, supra note 81, at 275. See also Indonesia-Automobile
Industry
case, supra note 145, 14.28.
153 See Vienna Convention, supra note 76, art. 33.4, which
states: "[e]xcept
where a particular text prevails in accordance with paragraph 1, when a
comparison of the authentic texts discloses a difference of meaning which the
application of articles 31 and 32 does not remove, the meaning which best
reconciles the texts, having regard to the object and purpose of the treaty, shall
be adopted."
154 GATT, supra note 24, art. XX. See Bree, supra note 32;
Charnovitz, supra
note 32.
155 For instance, Article 3.5 of the United Nations Framework Convention on
Climate Change provides: "[m]easures taken to combat climate change,
including unilateral ones, should not constitute a means of arbitrary or
unjustifiable discrimination or a disguised restriction on international trade." See
U.N. Framework Convention on Climate Change, May 9, 1992, 31 I.L.M. 849,
855 (1992) (entered into force Mar. 21, 1994) [hereinafter UNFCCC].
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way. This will allow the DSB to avoid the application of conflict
rules since there is no conflict. 156 Perhaps this isthe reason why
Joost Pauwelyn defends a broad definition of normative conflict,
not limited to two dispositions that cannot be complied with
simultaneously, but including two norms if one "constitutes, has
led to, or may lead to, a breach of the other."' 57 Even if a broad
definition of conflict is accepted, the possibility of considering
non-WTO rules as applicable law would not contribute to the
solution of one of the most contentious aspects of MEA-WTO
interactions, namely, disputes where the plaintiff Member is not a
contracting party to the MEA
cited by the defendant Member as
58
part of its legal arguments.
In the case where the covered agreements are perceived as
the only applicable law in the WTO, in trade disputes where one or
more WTO Members are not bound by the environmental
convention, or when a normative conflict is absent, international
law might still have some role to play in the DSB by means of the
customary rules of interpretation of public international law.
Being applicable to all possible MEA-WTO interactions, the
interpretation channel is the best option (at least in the short term)
to enhance mutual support among these normative systems, as it is
necessary to favor sustained development.
III.

MEAs

AS A MEANS TO INTERPRET THE

COVERED AGREEMENTS

Fixing the reach of a norm through interpretation is, in the
words of C. Femdtndez de Casadevante, a problem that delays or

156It is important to

emphasize that this does not mean that the DSB is going to

enforce MEAs. Instead, given the fact that there is no direct contradiction
between WTO rules and MEAs, the DSB could conclude that there is no reason
to apply the rules of conflicts to determine which treaty prevails.
157 This is Joost Pauwelyn's opinion of when two rules conflict. PAUWELYN,
supra note 92, at 176 (italics omitted).
158 However, the CTE recognizes that, "in cases where there is
a consensus
among Parties to an MEA to apply among themselves specifically mandated
trade measures, disputes between them over the use of such measures are
unlikely to occur in the WTO." See CTE Report 1996, supranote 59, 174 (iv).
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conditions the application of the rule. 159 Thus, elucidating the
meaning of a disposition, fixing its reach, clarifying its dark spots
and ambiguities are pre-existing conditions to the application of a
given norm by an international tribunal. 160 It is no surprise then
that the interpretation of the covered agreements is one of the
functions assigned to Panels and the Appellate Body.' 6 1 In this
regard, Article 3.2 of the DSU states that the DSB serves, among
other things, "to clarify the existing provisions of [the covered
agreements] in accordance with customary rules of interpretation
of public international law."' 162 Article 3.2 of the DSU does not
contain an explicit reference to the Vienna Convention on the Law
of Treaties (the Vienna Convention), however, the Appellate Body
has stated that customary rules of interpretation include Article 31
of the Vienna Convention. 163

The rules of interpretation of Article 31 of the Vienna
Convention could render a great service to sustainable development if they are used to favor synergies between MEAs and the
WTO. This is possible and desirable since some of the terms of
the covered agreements with more potential to create negative
159 C.

FERNANDEZ DE CASADEVANTE,

INTERNACIONALES

LA INTERPRETACION DE LAS NORMAS

36 (Editorial Aranzadi, 1996).

160 See ANTONIO REMIRO BROTONS, DERECHO INTERNACIONAL PUBLICO

306

(1983).
161 Article 1.1 of the DSU provides that its rules and procedures apply to
disputes brought pursuant to the consultation and dispute settlement provisions
of the agreements listed in Appendix I of the DSU (referred to in this
Understanding as the "covered agreements"). See DSU, supra note 67, art. 1.1.
162

Id. art.

163

Panel Report, European Communities-MeasuresAffecting the Approval and

3.2.

7.65, WT/DS291/R, WT/DS292/R,
Marketing of Biotech Products,
WT/DS293/R (Sep. 29, 2006) [hereinafter E.C. Biotech Products case];
Appellate Body Report, United States-Countervailing Duties on Certain
61-62,
Corrosion-Resistant Carbon Steel Flat Products from Germany,
WT/DS213/AB/R (Nov. 28, 2002); U.S. Gasoline case, supra note 34, at 17.
Article 32 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties has also been
applied in trade disputes as a supplementary means of interpretation, in order to
confirm the meaning resulting from the application of Article 31, or to
determine the meaning when the interpretation according to Article 31 leaves
the meaning ambiguous or obscure, or leads to a result which is manifestly
absurd or unreasonable. See U.S.-Tuna/Dolphin II case, supra note 38, 5.20;
Vienna Convention, supra note 76, arts, 31-32.
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interactions with MEAs have not yet been clearly defined; thus
they could be interpreted to favor mutual support between these
normative systems. This is the case of GATT Article XX where
the conditions of its introductory clause, and to some extent, of
paragraphs (b) and (g) are anything but clear. 164 Likewise, there is
a great deal of uncertainty about the goal of sustainable
development as it appears in the preamble of the Agreement
Establishing the WTO (The WTO Treaty). 165 The interpretation of
these conditions and concepts would affect inexorably MEA-WTO
possible interactions and sustainable development. It is here where
Article 31 rules of interpretation might have an important role to
play.
A.
A Teleological Interpretation of the Covered Agreements:
Aiming at Sustainable Development
The first paragraph of Article 31 states that "[a] treaty shall
be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning
to be given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in the light
of its object and purpose."'166 The language of the preamble of the

'64 John H. Jackson, one of the most renowned world trade experts, has said that
the terms "aribtrary or unjustified discrimination" and "disguised restriction" are

"so nebolous as to make exact definition imposible." JoH-N H. JACKSON, WORLD
TRADE AND THE LAW OF GATT 744 (1969). See also Julia Ya Qin, Defining
Nondiscrimination under the Law of the World Trade Organization, 23 B.U.
INT'L L.J. 215, 217-218, 253 (2005).

WTO Agreement, supra note 23._Some scholars assert that in order to give
meaning to the objective of sustainable development it is necessary to take into
account International Environmental Law principles and MEAs. See Gabrielle
Marceau, A Call for Coherence in International Law: Praises for the
161

ProhibitionAgainst "Clinical Isolation" in the WTO Dispute Settlement, 33 J.
WORLD TRADE 87, 107-109 (1999); Thomas J. Schoenbaum, The Decision in
the Shrimp-Turtle Case, 9 Y.B. INT'L ENVTL. L. 36, 37-38 (1998). The Appellate Body, for its part, has said: "the objective of sustainable development....
must add colour, texture and shading to the interpretation of the [covered]
agreements annexed to the WTO Agreement, in this case, the GATT 1994."
U.S.- Shrimp case, supra note 37, 153.
166 Vienna Convention, supra note 76, art. 31 (emphasis added).
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WTO Treaty comprises its context,' 67 reflects the intentions
(purposes) of the Members, and the objectives of the multilateral
trading system that should be taken into account to interpret
unclear terms of the covered agreements.
In this regard, it is important to note that when the WTO
was established the objective of "full use of the resources of the
world"' 16 8 set forth in the preamble of the GATT 1947 was no
longer considered appropriate for the trade regime given the
delicate state of the environment around the world. Consequently,
it was decided to introduce some environmental considerations as
part of the objectives for the new organization. As stated in the
preamble of the WTO Treaty, the traditional economic goals of the
regime, such as raising standards of living, ensuring full
employment and economic growth, should be pursued in
accordance with the objective of sustainable development; seeking
both to protect and preserve the environment and to enhance the
means for doing so. The objective of WTO Members with respect
to the relationship between trade and the environment has been
further elucidated in the Decision on Trade and Environment. In
this Decision, WTO Members expressed their intention to make
mutually supportive trade and environmental policies when they
said, "there should not be, nor need be, any policy contradiction
between upholding and safeguarding an open, non-discriminatory
and equitable multilateral trading system on the one hand, and
and the promotion of
acting for the protection of the environment,
' 69
sustainable development on the other."'
In short, the covered agreements shall be interpreted in
accordance with the objective of sustainable development, which
comprehends both the economic and environmental goals of the
WTO. Following this same line of thought, the Appellate Body
practically invites a teleological interpretation of trade obligations
when it said, "the objective of sustainable development.... must
167

Article 31.2 of the Vienna Convention provides in relevant part: "[tjhe

context for the purpose of the interpretation of a treaty shall comprise, in
addition to the text, including its preamble and annexes." Id., art. 31.2.
168 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat.
A-I , 55
U.N.T.S. 194.
169 Marrakesh Trade and Environment Decision, April 15, 1994, 33 I.L.M. 1267,
at 1267 (1994).
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add color, texture and shading to [the] interpretation of the
[covered] agreements ... , in this case the GATT."''

v

Although concrete actions needed to achieve sustainable
development are not always easily determined, there is no doubt
this objective aims to make social needs of development, economical needs of growth, and environmental needs of conservation
compatible.'
In the MEA-WTO context these seem to be
attainable only if protectionist measures are illegitimated through
interpretations of the covered agreements, and measures based on
authentic environmental motives and applied in a non-discriminatory
fashion are, by the same means, given a safe port in the
72
WTO.

1

An interpretation contrary to the objective of sustainable
development would be one that excessively limits the recourse to
Article XX's environmental exceptions in a way that would
impede the adoption of non-protectionist or non-discriminatory
measures to pursue MEA objectives. Quite the opposite, since
they are taken as a response to an international environmental
problem identified by the International Community, an interpretation that favors sustainable development should lead one to conclude that measures like this do not result in arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination and do not constitute a disguised restriction
on international trade as dictated by Article XX. It should also
lead one to conclude that MEA measures are necessary as required
by paragraph (b) of this article; otherwise the degree of effort, time
and economic resources devoted to the difficult task of adoption of
an MEA could not be understood. In addition, if MEA restrictions
aim to protect an exhaustible natural resource, it could be accepted
that the measures are related to the conservation as required by
paragraph (g). As Gabrielle Marceau points out, a trade restriction
permitted in an MEA could be presumed to satisfy the
requirements of Article XX.' 73
170 U.S.- Shrimp case, supranote 37, 153.
171WORLD COMM'N ON ENV'T & DEV., supra note 1, at 43.
172See Agenda 21, supra note 2, ch. 39; Sydney M. Cone,

III, et al., New York

Law School Centerfor InternationalLaw Symposium on World Trade and the
Environment, 19 N.Y.L. SCH. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 163, 178-79 (1999).
173Marceau, supra note 164, at 131. In the European Communities' opinion
"[t]he fact that trade measures MEAs may contain were negotiated and agreed
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This interpretation finds support in the U.S.-Shrimp case, in
which the Appellate Body argued that the fact that the United
States negotiated protection agreements seriously with some but
not with other Members affected by the restriction gave weight to
its determination denying the justification in Article XX to the
measure in question. 74 In the Appellate Body's opinion, the unilateral character of the application of this restriction "heighten[ed]
[its] disruptive and discriminatory influence ... and underscore[d]

its unjustifiability."' 175 Therefore, the existence of a MEA should,
likewise, eliminate any possible disruptive or discriminatory influence on multilateral measures and should also heighten their
justifiability. This interpretation finds additional support in Principle 12 of the Rio Declaration, which contains a preference for
multilateral measures over76unilateral ones to deal with international
environmental problems. 1

Given that environmental concerns are often used as an
excuse to protect domestic producers from foreign competitors, an
interpretation of Article XX in accordance with the objective of
sustainable development should allow a refutation of a
compatibility presumption favoring a MEA, if there is a proof in
this regard.
A teleological interpretation of environmental exceptions in
the line described above would not only be applicable in trade
disputes where all the WTO Members involved are bound by the
MEA in whose context the trade measure is taken. It might as
well, and this is its main virtue, be applicable when not all the
Members in the dispute are parties to the environmental agreement.
This is due to the fact that all WTO Members have committed to
the objective of sustainable development, which is both the object
and purpose of the covered agreement as well as part of its context,
by consensus in a multilateral context should be a guarantee against
discriminatory action and their use for protectionist purposes." See Submission
by the European Community to the Committee on Trade and Environment,
Resolving the Relationship between WTO Rules and MultilateralEnvironmental
Agreements, 4, WT/CTE/W/170 (Oct. 19, 2000).
174
175

176

U.S.- Shrimp case, supra note 37, 172.
id.
Rio
Declaration, supra note 2, princ. 12.
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and thus shall guide their interpretations. A MEA, even if it is not
binding to all WTO Members in a trade dispute, could be relevant,
for instance, to elucidate if an environmental measure is justified in
terms of Article XX. The fact that a WTO Member is not party to
an MEA does not mean, in any way, that certain measures taken in
this context are unnecessary, not related to conservation, or
unjustified. Quite the contrary, as was stated above, the existence
of a MEA is, without doubt, the best proof that an environmental
problem is real enough so as to justify multilateral environmental
measures in Article XX, unless otherwise proven.
This reasoning finds support in the Appellate Body report
in the U.S. -Shrimp/Turtle case where it interpreted the meaning of
the term exhaustible natural resources in Article XX (g) resorting
to environmental conventions to which not all the WTO Members
were parties. 177 Likewise, the recent report of the Panel in the
E.C.-Biotech Products case said that, in order to be taken into
account to interpret the WTO Agreements, an international law
rule does not need to be binding on all parties in the dispute, if
such rules are informative and help to clarify the ordinary meaning
of the WTO rules. 178 Although the ordinary meaning of the terms
in the WTO rules, such as those of the introductory clause, could
be defined with the help of a dictionary (as the Panel observes)
other relevant rules of international law may in some cases aid a
treaty interpreter to establish, or confirm, the ordinary meaning of
treaty terms in the specific context in which they are used. 179 For
instance, according to the Concise Oxford English Dictionary, the
term justified means "[p]rove to be right or reasonable or to have a
good reason for."' 180 In a trade environmental dispute, where the
environmental exceptions of Article XX and the conditions of the
introductory clause are to be interpreted, the existence of a MEA
with trade restrictions would certainly be informative to determine

177 In the U.S.- Shrimp case, the Appellate Body interpreted the term
"exhaustible natural resources" in GATT Article XX (g) using CITES, an
international environmental agreement that is not binding on all WTO Members.
U.S.- Shrimp case, supra note 37, 132.
178 E.C. Biotech Products case, supra note 165,
7.93-7.94.

Id. 7.92.
180 THE CONCISE OXFORD ENGLISH DICTONARY (1 th ed. 2006).
179
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if the measure is reasonable or if it has good reason for being
applied.
In addition to the general rule of interpretation of Article
31.1 of the Vienna Convention, paragraph 3(c) of this same article
could be used to favor MEA and WTO synergies. Nonetheless,
this option, identical to the one explained earlier, has a limited
application and does not contribute to the solution of disputes
where one of the Members involved is not a contracting party in
the MEA.
The Principle of Systemic Integration in MEAs-WTO
B.
Relations
Article 31(3)(c) of the Vienna Convention states that,
among other things, in a treaty interpretation, any relevant rules of
international law applicable in the relations between the parties
shall be taken into account. The purpose of this article is, according to the ILC, to connect treaties as aspects of a general group of
States' rights and obligations. In the ILC opinion, Article 31 (3)(c)
contains what could be called the principle of systemic integration;
in other words, it is a guideline according to which treaties should
be interpreted in the context of all norms and principles of
international law, i.e. international law seen as a system. 8 ' Thus,
as an interpretative tool, the principle of systemic integration
of a treaty as an agreement governed by
expresses the nature
82
international law. 1
Some scholars consider the reference to any relevant rules
broad enough to permit the DSB to take into account, in its
interpretative function, any treaty or customary rule, even if it is
not part of the covered agreements. 183 Evidently, recourse to other
norms of international law would only be possible if the norm to be
interpreted is unclear or if its ambiguity is resolved through
ILC's Conclusions on the Fragmentation of International Law, supra note
105, 17.
182 Id. See generally Campbell McLachlan, The principle of systemic integration
and article 31 (3) (c) of the Vienna Convention, 54 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 279
(2005).
183 See French, supra note 117, at 303; Marceau, supra note 165, at 178.
181
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remission to these other non-WTO rules. 184 The amplitude of
Article 31(3)(c) is deceptive since only relevant rules of
international law applicable in the relations between the parties
could be considered for interpretative purposes. The problem is
that it is not clear if the allusion to the relations between the parties
refers to: 1) all WTO Members; 2) all parties in a given trade
dispute, but not necessarily all WTO Members; or 3) more than
one WTO Member.' 85 With regard to this, the opinions that can be
found in the doctrine are divided. 86 The position of the DSB is
reflected in the recently adopted report of the Panel in the E.C. Biotech Products case, where it refused to consider the Convention
on Biological Diversity and Biosafety Protocol to interpret the
Agreement of Sanitary and Phitosanitary Measures, arguing that
some of the Members involved in the dispute were not bound by
them. 187
The panel interpreted Article 31(3)(c) as requiring
consideration of those rules of international law which are
applicable in the relations between all parties to the treaty being
interpreted, namely all WTO Members. 188 However, the Panel
created some confusion when it observed that:
184 The

ILC has said that it should not be necessary to resort to other rules of
International Law, unless there is an interpretation problem with a treaty.
Normally, it would be necessary to resort to Article 31.3 (c) in cases where: a) a
treaty norm is obscure, and the ambiguity could be clarified though other rules
of international law; b) the meaning of the terms used in a treaty are clearly
established in customary international law, therefore, this could be consider the
meaning parties intended to give them; or c) the terms used in a treaty accept
different meaning and other international law rules could help to determine the
exact content of the norm. ILC Fragmentation of International Law, supra note
106, 7 347.
185 See ILC's Final Report on Fragmentation of International
Law which
concluded that Article 31.3(c): "[d]oes not specify whether, in determining
relevance and applicability one must have regard to all parties to the treaty in
question, or merely to those in dispute." ILC's Final Report on Fragmentation of
International Law, supra note 114, T 426 (c).
116 E.C. Biotech Products case, supra note 165, 7 7.74-7.75. Some scholars
maintain that the allusion to the "parties" in Article 31.3(c) could be interpreted
as referring only to the parties in the dispute, not to all the WTO members. See
Palmeter & Mavroidis, supra note 132, at 411. But see PAUWELYN, supra note
92, at 258.
187 E.C. Biotech Products case, supranote 165,
7.74-7.75.
188 Id.
7.69-7.72.
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[T]he present case is not one in which relevant rules of
international law are applicable in the relations between all parties
to the dispute, but not between all WTO Members, and in which all
parties to the dispute argue that a multilateral WTO agreement
should be interpreted in the light of these other rules of international law. Therefore, we need not, and do not, take a position on
whether in such a situation we would be entitled to take the
relevant other rules of international law into account. 189
This paragraph gives the impression that the Panel was not
sure if non-WTO rules, in order to be taken into account in
interpreting the covered agreements, had to be binding on all WTO
Members or if it was enough that they were binding on all the
WTO Members in the dispute. In any case, since Article 31(3)(c)
has no application on disputes where only some of the Members
involved are bound by other non-WTO rules, it can not be used as
a normative base to favor mutual support between MEAs and the
WTO in their most contentious possible interactions.
Another disputed issue in this context is if a non-WTO rule
needs to be concluded prior to the covered agreements in order to
be considered relevant in their interpretation. 90 Although at an
early stage Panels refused to take into account treaties concluded
after the GATT of 1947, the Appellate Body has said that a treaty
interpreter must read GATT articles (in this specific case talking
about Article XX (g)) in the "light of contemporary concerns of the
community of nations about the protection and conservation of the
environment."' 91 There are, in its opinion, concepts whose
definitions are not static but evolutionary such an exhaustible
natural resource and sustainable development. 192 In this case the
former was interpreted, taking into account some environmental
treaties. 93 Thus, it seems that an MEA, even if adopted after
1994, may be relevant to interpret evolutionary concepts such as
189 Id. 7.72

190The whole purpose of the interpretative function is to clarify what was the
intention of the parties when they agreed on a certain disposition; therefore, it
seems that a norm cannot help in this endeavor if it did not exist when the
obscure norm was negotiated.
191
U.S.- Shrimp case, supra note 37, 129.
192 id.

193

Id. g 129-131.
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those in Article XX or the concept of sustainable development in
the preamble of the WTO Treaty.
If the allusion to the parties in Article 31(3)(c) is interpreted
as a reference to all the parties in the dispute, which if in a given
case happens to be bound by an MEA, the principle of systemic
integration could be used to enhance the mutual support of MEAs
and WTO rules. For example, in the case of application of a
multilateral measure between two WTO Members that are bound
by an MEA, it should be concluded, unless proven otherwise, that
the restriction is justified under Article XX's environmental
exceptions. This is a logical conclusion because if the Members
have agreed to be bound by an MEA with trade measures, then
they acknowledged the importance of the environmental problem
and the need to use trade measures to tackle it. This interpretation
finds support in the Oil Platform case.1 94 The ICJ, having Article
31(3)(c) of the Vienna Convention in mind, observed that other
norms of international law used to interpret a different treaty could
be applied and influence the legality of a measure taken in this
context. 195 The ICJ resorted to customary rules about the use of
194On

2 November 1992, the Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran filed
in the Registry of the ICJ an application instituting proceedings against the
United States in respect of a dispute "aris[ing] out of the attack [on] and
destruction of three offshore oil production complexes, owned and operated for
commercial purposes by the National Iranian Oil Company, by several warships
of the United States Navy on 19 October 1987 and 18 April 1988, respectively."
Iran contended that these acts constituted a "fundamental breach" of various
provisions of the Treaty of Amity, Economic Relations and Consular Rights
between the United States and Iran, which was signed in Tehran on 15 August
1955 and entered into force on 16 June 1957 [hereinafter called "the 1955
Treaty"], as well as a breach of international law. The United States, among
other arguments, responded saying that the actions complained of by Iran "were
measures necessary to protect the essential security interests of the United
States" and therefore were justified in terms of Article XX I (d) of the 1955
Treaty. The Treaty reads, in relevant part, as follows: "[t]he present Treaty shall
not preclude the application of measures: ...
d) necessary to fulfil the obligations
of a High Contracting Party for the maintenance or restoration of international
peace and security, or necessary to protect its essential security interests." Oil
Platforms (Iran v. U.S.), 2003 I.C.J. 161, 166, 178-79, 182 (Nov. 6) [hereinafter
Oil Plataforms case].
195In its decision the ICJ concluded that "under the general rules of treaty
interpretation, as reflected in the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of
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force to interpret the 1955 Treaty of Amity, Economic Relations
and Consular Rights between the United States and Iran, which
stated that nothing in the Treaty shall preclude the application of
measures "necessary ...for the maintenance or restoration of
international peace and security, or necessary to protect [] essential
security interests [of the Contracting Parties]".' 96 The Court said
that this exception could only justify measures involving the use of
force in self-defense, i.e. as a response to a previous armed
attack. 97 The ICJ effectively introduced customary law obligations of use of force into the 1955 Treaty through Article 31(3)(c).
Although it is true that in its findings the ICJ has only said that the
measure in question was not justified under the exception of the
agreement of 1955, it does not change the fact that the obligations
of this exception 98were determined resorting to other norms of
international law.'
CONCLUSION

Both the Ministerial Conference and the DSB of the WTO
appear to have echoed the preference contained in Principle 12 of
the Rio Declaration for trade measures based on international
consensus over unilateral measures. This could lead to the
conclusion that trade measures in MEAs, if challenged before the
Treaties, interpretation must take into account "any relevant rules of
international law applicable in the relations between the parties" (Article 31,
paragraph 3 (c)). The Court cannot accept that Article XX, paragraph I (d), of
the 1955 Treaty was intended to operate wholly independently of the relevant
rules of international law on the use of force, so as to be capable of being
successfully invoked, even in the limited context of a claim for breach of the
Treaty, in relation to an unlawful use of force. The application of the relevant
rules of international law relating to this question thus forms an integral part of
the task of interpretation entrusted to the Court by Article XXI, paragraph 2, of
the 1955 Treaty." Id. at 182. See generally Enzo Cannizzaro & Beatrice Bonafd,
Fragmenting International Law through Compromissory Clauses? Some
Remarks on the Decision of the ICJ in the Oil Platforms Case, 16 EUR. J. INT'L
L. 481 (2005).
196 Treaty of Amity, Economic Relations, and Consular Rights, U.S.-Iran, art.
XX(I)(d), Aug. 15, 1955, 8 U.S.T. 899.
19'
Oil Platforms case, 2003 I.C.J. at 190, 195-96, 198-99.
198 See
id.
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DSB, might have a better chance of being considered WTOconsistent than unilateral ones. However, at best, this would turn
out to be only partially true. First, despite some decisions of
Panels and the Appellate Body of the DSB which seem to have
pronounced a vote favoring multilateralism in the WTO, a closer
look at these reports suggests prudence before any categorical
statement is made in that regard. Second, not all kinds of measures
in MEAs are seen, and treated, in the same way in the WTO. Of
all the range of measures that can be applied in this context, only
the less contentious and problematic have received some degree of
attention in the WTO. Thus, if a multilateral measure were
brought before the DSB of the WTO, it would most probably have
to face the same difficulties as unilateral measures to be considered
compatible with WTO rules.
At this point, the role that non-WTO rules, such as MEAs,
can play in the DSB gains importance in the MEA-WTO
relationships and thus in sustainable development. Some authors
suggest that non-WTO rules could be considered applicable law in
the DSB, something that could be used to introduce some balance
between environmental and trade considerations in the WTO. But,
in addition to the disagreement of some scholars with this
approach, accepting non-WTO rules as applicable law in the DSB
will not create a solution for the most contentious aspects of MEAWTO interactions: potential controversies involving WTO
members not bound by the MEA in whose context the disputed
measure has been applied, or disputes arising as a consequence of
the application of a non-specific trade measure. The teleological
interpretative approach, being applicable to all ranges of
interactions between these normative systems, is the best option to
favor their mutual support in conformity with the objective of
sustainable development. The possibility of taking into account
non-WTO rules, such as MEAs, to interpret the commercial
agreements has been acknowledged by the Appellate Body report
in the US.-Shrimp case and recently confirmed by the Panel report
in the E. C.-Biotech Productscase.

